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HOW PRIVACY KILLED KATZ: A TALE OF COGNITIVE 
FREEDOM AND THE PROPERTY OF PERSONHOOD AS 
FOURTH AMENDMENT NORM 
Christian M. Halliburton* 
[F]reedom of thought . . . is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of 
nearly every other form of freedom.  With rare aberrations a pervasive 
recognition of that truth can be traced in our history, political and 
legal.1 
 
[I]f there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively 
calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought—
not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the 
thought that we hate.2 
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 1. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937). 
 2. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
With each passing day, new technologies push the horizons of 
official government investigative and surveillance activity deeper and 
deeper into the mind and consciousness of the surveilled subject.  While 
law enforcement agencies have always relied on observing the behavior 
and activity of suspicious targets, and there has been little judicial ink 
spent preserving the confidentiality of such observable activity, the law 
has been slow to respond to rapid increases in the capacity or scope of 
official observation that the advance of technologically sophisticated 
surveillance techniques helped facilitate.  The sampling of techniques  at 
the center of this Article allow the operators to analyze, with a very high 
degree of accuracy, the cognitive activity occurring within the human 
brain, certain types of substantive information that may be stored there, 
and even the likely decision-making processes the brain has engaged in 
or will in the future engage.  Because these techniques allow access to 
the cerebral and neurological landscape of the subject, from an 
individual’s emotional and ethical profile to her memories and 
intentions, I have chosen to label this class of information-gathering 
methods as cognitive camera technology (CCT) for convenience.3 
The universe of CCTs and potential for new uses is expanding.  
One of the most basic (if a brain monitoring device can ever be such) 
CCTs uses the brain as a data source in order to make lie detection 
determinations.4  One early version of a CCT, a proprietary technique 
 
 3. Christian M. Halliburton, Letting Katz Out of the Bag: Cognitive Freedom and Fourth 
Amendment Fidelity, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 309, 310 (2007).  That initial article, on which the present 
effort builds, provides a solution-based perspective on the need to revisit and reformulate current 
conceptions of the Fourth Amendment’s purpose and primary instrumental orientation in order to 
adequately protect individual privacy rights in the age of advancing brain and CCT technologies, 
while simultaneously maintaining constitutional harmony with our shared social, religious, and 
political beliefs regarding privacy. 
 4. See id. at 319-20 (explaining that lie detection devices are now better able to register 
deception due to recent technological developments).  Charles Keckler has also touted the benefits 
involved in using new brain imaging technology to detect brain processes that were at one time 
immeasurable—particularly the subtle activity involved in deception.  See Charles N. W. Keckler, 
Cross-Examining the Brain: A Legal Analysis of Neural Imaging for Credibility Impeachment, 57 
HASTINGS L.J. 509, 510 (2006).  Keckler explains: 
It is the recent technological changes in brain imaging, particularly the visualization of 
the brain while it is actively working—so called “functional imaging”—that have 
allowed cognitive neuroscience the potential to identify relatively subtle processes such 
2
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called Brain Fingerprinting, has been used in a smattering of court 
cases,5 and has been subjected to only limited testing by the scientific 
community,6 but it continues to hold much promise as the technique is 
refined.  One of those refinements has extended Brain Fingerprinting’s 
utility into the realm of knowledge confirmation—beyond detecting 
dishonesty, Brain Fingerprinting can in some instances detect the 
presence of relevant knowledge or information in the mind of the subject 
without relying on that subject’s communicative or verbal response.7 
Moreover, Brain Fingerprinting is no longer alone in the market for 
CCT development, and the era of commercial consumption of cognitive 
surveillance services is at hand.8  For example, the Cephos 
Corporation—whose company slogan reads “When Truth Matters”9—is 
currently marketing a “truth verification brain imaging service [which] 
provides independent validation that you are telling the truth.”10  Cephos 
relies on a second proprietary method of using functional MRI (fMRI) 
that it claims derives from the original scientific research, conducted in 
 
as deception.  Moreover, the ability to examine in real time the response of the subject 
brain during a question and answer session makes it feasible to use this technique 
forensically, so long as the pattern of brain activity corresponding to deception is 
sufficiently well-characterized. 
Id. 
 5. See Slaughter v. State, 105 P.3d 832, 835 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005) (finding that there was 
“no real evidence that Brain Fingerprinting has been extensively tested, has been presented and 
analyzed in numerous peer-review articles in recognized scientific publications, has a very low rate 
of error, has objective standards to control its operation, and/or is generally accepted within the 
‘relevant scientific community’”). 
 6. See id.; see also Lawrence A. Farwell & Sharon S. Smith, Using Brain MERMER Testing 
to Detect Knowledge Despite Efforts to Conceal, 46 J. OF FORENSIC SCI. 135, 136 (2001) (“Recent 
research has shown that electrical brain responses can be a reliable indicator of information-
processing activities in the brain.”); see also Andre A. Moenssens, Brain Fingerprinting—Can it Be 
Used to Detect the Innocence of Persons Charged with a Crime?, 70 UMKC L. REV. 891, 900 
(2002) (noting that the research surrounding brain fingerprinting is focused on finding ways to 
indirectly detect lying). 
 7. Halliburton, supra note 3, at 320-21; see LAWRENCE A. FARWELL, DETECTION OF FBI 
AGENTS USING BRAIN FINGERPRINTING TECHNOLOGY: A NEW PARADIGM FOR 
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL DETECTION OF CONCEALED INFORMATION (1993), 
http://brainwavescience.com/FBIStudy.php (“Brain Fingerprinting technology depends only on 
brain information processing, it does not depend on the emotional response of the subject.”). 
 8. See Christopher Intagliata, Is the MRI Lie Detector Test Reliable?, SCIENCELINE, Nov. 3, 
2008, http://scienceline.org/2008/11/03/ask-intagliata-lie-detection-fmri-brain-scan/ (providing 
overview of increasing commercialization and market consumption of brain-based lie detection 
services). 
 9. Cephos Corp,  http://www.cephoscorp.com/index.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2008). 
 10. Basic Lie Detection Technology, http://www.cephoscorp.com/ld-tech-basics.htm (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2009). 
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2001, which pioneered the use of fMRI to detect deception,11 and that it 
has now achieved a 97% accuracy rate in blind clinical tests.12  Cephos 
thus appears to be building the basis in accepted scientific opinion and 
verification that Brain Fingerprinting has yet to establish, and which 
may have slowed its spread in the relevant markets. 
There are, of course, other companies currently pursuing this line of 
research and product development, no doubt due in part to the 
tremendous financial upside for those able to create a product that can 
satisfy the wide range of potential consumers of brain-based lie detection 
tests.  One final example of currently available CCT services is offered 
by California corporation No Lie MRI, which claims to provide 
“unbiased methods for the detection of deception and other information 
stored in the brain.”13  Particularly telling is No Lie MRI’s contention 
that “[l]egal battles often revolve around unsubstantiated claims that 
cannot be proven by hard evidence [and that i]n legal cases, NO LIE 
MRI will enable objective, scientific evidence regarding truth 
verification or lie detection to be submitted in a similar manner to which 
DNA evidence is used.”14  While the time of any perceived equivalence 
in the reliability of DNA evidence and CCT evidence in the American 
legal system has yet to come, there has been at least one widely reported 
use of CCT evidence in a criminal proceeding internationally.15 
Moving beyond present knowledge confirmation, researchers are 
also using variants of the CCT concept to predict and analyze intentions 
and future decision-making probabilities.16  European scientists appear 
to be leading the charge, but they have already reported development of 
an fMRI “scanner” capable of monitoring the brain for specific indicia 
of decision-making moments occurring in various areas (for different 
 
 11. Cephos Corporation, A Brief History, http://www.cephoscorp.com/history.htm (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2008). 
 12. Id. 
 13. No Lie MRI, http://www.noliemri.com/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2008).  
 14. See Product Benefits, http://www.noliemri.com/products/ProductBenefits.htm (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2008). 
 15. See Anand Giridharadas, India’s Novel Use of Brain Scans in Courts Is Debated, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 14, 2008, at A10 (reporting the conviction of Aditi Sharma of murder based on brain 
scans that proved her possession of “experiential knowledge” proving her involvement in the 
planning and execution of the crime).  This prosecution was not based on the proprietary versions of 
CCTs currently marketed in the United States, but upon the Brain Electrical Oscillation Signature 
(BEOS) Test developed by Dr. Champadi Raman Mukundan in India, but BEOS is related to the 
same fMRI science on which the American counterparts rely.  Id. 
 16. See Ian Sample, Brain Scans that Can Read People’s Intentions, GUARDIAN, Feb. 9, 2007, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/story/0,,2009217,00.html?jusrc=rss&feed=11  (summarizing the 
ethical issues involved in developing technology that can predict human behavior). 
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 42 [2009], Iss. 3, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol42/iss3/6
11-HALLIBURTON_COPYFORPRINTER_FINAL.DOC 4/27/2009  12:44 PM 
2009] HOW PRIVACY KILLED KATZ 807 
areas control decision-making and action of different types).17  Those 
decision-making moments are not only tracked and recorded, but there 
appears to be a signature associated with those decision-making 
moments that allow prediction of the substance of the decision before 
the decision is consciously reached.18  With such a capacity, it may be 
possible to determine a person’s actions or intentions before they are 
manifest.19 
Finally, neuroscientists are improving their understanding of the 
brain’s relationship to personality traits like morality, and refining the 
application of technology designed to analyze those portions and 
processes of the brain that are thought to be responsible for that aspect of 
our programming.20  At least one study, involving neurology patients 
who had suffered specific damage to identifiable areas of the brain, has 
emerged to show how physical changes in certain brain structures will 
alter moral standards.21  Although it is not yet possible to create a 
complete moral personality profile from this sort of monitoring, little 
further development in this area would be necessary before brain scans 
can reliably identify outliers who defy the orthodox moral conventions 
of the community.22 
 
 17. See id. (explaining a study in which researchers used a brain scan to determine, in 
advance, whether participants would add or subtract two numbers that flashed on a screen). 
 18. See id. (noting the seventy percent accuracy rate of the study described above). 
 19. According to Barbara Sahakian, a professor of neuropsychology at Cambridge University: 
[a] lot of neuroscientists in the field are very cautious and say we can’t talk about 
reading individuals’ minds, and right now that is very true, but we’re moving ahead so 
rapidly, it’s not going to be that long before we will be able to tell whether someone’s 
making up a story, or whether someone intended to do a crime with a certain degree of 
certainty. 
Id. 
 20. See Martha J. Farah & Paul Root Wolpe, Monitoring and Manipulating Brain Function: 
New Neuroscience Technologies and Their Ethical Implications, 34 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 35, 44  
(2004) (“If specific abilities, personality traits, and dispositions are manifest in characteristic 
patterns of brain activation and can be manipulated by specific neurochemical interventions, then 
they must be part of the physical world.”); see also Martha J. Farah, Neuroethics: The Practical and 
the Philosophical, 9 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 1, 34-35 (2005) (explaining that brain imaging 
technology can currently measure neurological activity involving specific psychological traits, such 
as racial attitudes and sexual attraction). 
 21. Benedict Carey, Brain Injury Said to Affect Moral Choices, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2007, at 
A19; see Robert Lee Hotz, Scientists Draw Link Between Morality and Brain’s Wiring, WALL ST. 
J., May 11, 2007, at B1 (describing a medical experiment in which scientists used neurology 
patients to demonstrate a neurological basis for moral judgment). 
 22. See, e.g., Hotz, supra note 21 (explaining that people who suffered a rare injury to a 
specific area of the brain were more likely to express a willingness to defy certain societal norms 
such as harming one person to save the life of another). 
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Each of these initiatives redefines the indistinct and, at times, dimly 
perceived boundary between the individual and the community 
collective, or redraws the line separating the person and the personal 
from the public.23  This line drawing is a core function of any legal 
system,24 and of our Constitution specifically.25  Defining the powers of 
the people (or of persons) as compared to the powers of the state is a 
relational exercise26 which, however they may ultimately be mapped, 
produces certain zones of exclusion,27 aspects in the life of the 
constitutional person where the government is denied a place and is 
powerless to forcibly intrude.28  In times past, society had instinctively 
and unflinchingly treated the mind of an individual as one of those zones 
of exclusion,29 and there has developed a widely shared belief in the 
existence and value of individual cognitive freedom.30 
 
 23. See generally CRAIG JACKSON CALHOUN, HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 2 (MIT 
Press 1992) (discussing Habermas’ theory about the role the “public sphere”—or that portion of an 
individual that exists outside of his own thoughts and relates to the world at large—plays in shaping 
public opinion and societal values). 
 24. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE 
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996) (explaining “why 
human [or individual, subjective] rights and the principle of popular sovereignty [or a commitment 
to the validity of contractarian community self-organization and governance] . . . constitute the sole 
ideas that can justify modern law”). 
 25. Robert A. Sedler, The Legitimacy Debate in Constitutional Adjudication: An Assessment 
and a Different Perspective, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 93, 126 (1983) (“Our Constitution embodies the 
fundamental concept that no government, no matter how democratic and no matter how electorally 
accountable it may be, can violate important individual rights.  The government cannot do certain 
things simply because no government should ever be able to do them . . . . [T]he overriding 
principle of the structure of constitutional governance established by our Constitution is the 
principle of limitation on government power . . . .”). 
 26. HABERMAS, supra note 24 at 133.  Habermas states that informal public opinion-
formation generates “influence”; influence is transformed into “communicative power” through the 
channels of political elections.  Communicative power is again transformed into “administrative 
power” through legislation.  This influence, carried forward by communicative power, gives law its 
legitimacy and thereby provides the political power of the state its binding force. 
 27. Halliburton, supra note 3, at 313; see Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905) 
(“There is . . . a sphere within which the individual may assert the supremacy of his own will and 
rightfully dispute the authority of any human government, especially of any free government 
existing under a written constitution, to interfere with the exercise of that will.”). 
 28. See Halliburton, supra note 3, at 313 (arguing that the Constitution grants individuals the 
right to be free from unwanted intrusion into specific areas of life and provides important 
protections against any action by the government in violation of this right); id. at 327-28 
(recognizing the importance of an individual’s sense of self in relation to the rest of society, 
including the concept that our thoughts provide the basis for who we are and how we view the 
world in which we live); see also MORRIS ROSENBERG, CONCEIVING THE SELF 5-51 (Basic Books 
1979) (discussing the concept of self as it applies to mankind, including the thoughts and feelings 
that make a person an “object” as opposed to a “subject”). 
 29. Halliburton, supra note 3, at 313. 
 30. Id. at 310. 
6
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The panoply of burgeoning CCTs now threatens this consistency 
because it is no longer realistic, or wise, to assume that information 
within and about the brain is off-limits to interested government actors.31  
With each new incursion into the individual’s province of cognitive 
freedom or autonomy comes an opportunity to resist and reconsider the 
legal provisions that create this particular zone of exclusion.  Given the 
severity of the risks inherent in unchecked and unreflective use of CCTs, 
this reconsideration can no longer be deferred. 
When viewed carefully, and in their full context, the specific CCTs 
adverted to and the larger trend towards cognitive surveillance present 
social and legal challenges of fundamental magnitude.32  Aside from 
breaching the walls of protection surrounding constitutionalized zones of 
exclusion—that is, aside from enabling the state to intrude where the 
Constitution says it shall not—non-consensual use of CCTs threaten 
deeper harms to our shared notions of social, spiritual, and political 
identity.33  As detailed elsewhere, but still of relevance here, 
governmental use of CCTs may intrude upon the individual realization 
of a full and robust sense of self,34 may impede effective civic 
participation in the democratic system,35 and may even complicate our 
relationship with the divine or other metaphysical yearnings.36  This, 
arguably, presents a crisis to which the Constitution must respond. 
Yet the current legal framework, and specifically the existing 
doctrines of the Fourth Amendment,37 are not and cannot be adequately 
 
 31. See id. at 316-17 (theorizing that political power involves the ability to have access to and 
control of information, and that there is great incentive for people in power to develop and use new 
technology to extract such information from those who may have it). 
 32. Id. at 310.  See generally Jeffrey Bellin, The Significance (if any) for the Federal Criminal 
Justice System of Advances in Lie Detection Technology, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 711 (2007); Leo Kittay, 
Note, The Admissibility of fMRI Lie Detection: The Cultural Bias Against “Mind Reading” Devices, 
72 BROOK. L. REV. 1351 (2007); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AND 
INTELLIGENCE METHODOLOGY FOR EMERGENT NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE/NEURAL 
RESEARCH, EMERGING COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE AND RELATED TECHNOLOGIES (National 
Academies Press 2008). 
 33. Halliburton, supra note 3, at 332-41. 
 34. See id. at 332-35 (linking the ability of CCTs to intrude into the mind of a person with the 
loss of identity, due to the fact that such intrusions interrupt the intimate relationship a person has 
with her thoughts). 
 35. See id. at 329-31 (considering the negative effects of labeling people based on what their 
brain activity suggests they might do in the future, including limiting free expression and exchange 
of ideas because society will assume such people have little of value to add to open discussions). 
 36. See id. at 336-38 (drawing a connection between religious experience and our internal 
thought processes—specifically noting the role “visionaries” and “prophets” played in shaping 
religious thought due to their inner spiritual experiences, and finding that science is dangerously 
close to explaining aspects of religion in terms of neurology). 
 37. This Article’s targeted exploration of the Fourth Amendment should not be taken to 
7
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responsive to this fundamental challenge.  The modern Fourth 
Amendment is a creature of the Supreme Court’s somewhat 
schizophrenic privacy doctrine,38 and privacy simply cannot keep the 
mind free in the shadow of CCT development and use.39  Each of the 
available Fourth Amendment approaches,40 all of which have their 
genesis in the privacy norm elevated to constitutional rule in Katz v. 
United States,41 are individually and collectively incapable of preventing 
the government from forcibly penetrating your mind.42  If that is so, 
privacy has failed us. 
As it turns out, that failure might have been averted forty years ago, 
if the Katz Court had either spoken more clearly about the principles that 
animate the Fourth Amendment and not been content to articulate a 
descriptive explanation of its decision that masquerades as a principle,43 
 
suggest that CCTs and their underlying processes do not implicate other social and legal 
considerations.  For example, CCTs will inevitably raise serious questions regarding the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, and will complicate the related 
definitions of compulsion, of testimony, and of the freedom of conscience that traditionally has 
grounded the privilege.  While the property-infused model of the Fourth Amendment developed 
here can in many ways inform forward-looking interrogation of the Fifth Amendment, that 
interaction falls outside the ambit of the present undertaking and must be left for another day.  
 38. See Cheryl Kettler Corrada, Comment, Dow Chemical and Ciraolo: For Government 
Investigators the Sky’s No Limit, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 667, 668-69 (1987) (discussing how the 
Court’s adoption of the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine expanded the scope of Fourth 
Amendment protection but provided a less mechanical guideline for government investigators 
seeking to avoid the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement). 
 39. See Halliburton, supra note 3, at 322-24 (discussing the way in which CCTs are currently 
used to determine whether a person has relevant information, but noting that the technology is not 
currently advanced enough for routine use by law enforcement, nor is such routine use currently 
foreseeable). 
 40. Those alternative approaches generally entail: (1) an expectation that searches and 
seizures will be based on probable cause and conducted pursuant to a warrant, unless the context 
presents a recognized exception to the warrant requirement; (2) a more generalized inquiry into the 
reasonableness of the police intrusion; or (3) an analysis which focuses on the nature of sense-
enhancing technologies employed during the intrusion.  Id. at 340-43, 350-51. 
 41. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  
 42. See Halliburton, supra note 3, at 340-41 (setting forth the warrant preference approach, in 
which law enforcement officers must obtain a warrant from a magistrate before conducting a search, 
and explaining that such a Fourth Amendment approach would not protect a person against the use 
of CCTs because officers would only need to demonstrate a reasonable belief that a person has 
specific knowledge about a crime); id. at 342-50 (explaining the warrant exceptions approach, in 
which the Court labels certain activity—including the use of some technology—outside the scope of 
Fourth Amendment protection when such technology is easily accessible by the general public); id. 
at 354-56 (maintaining that the reasonableness approach—which would involve the use of a 
balancing test by the Court to determine when the interests of law enforcement to effectively 
investigate crime outweigh the rights of an individual—is most likely to shape the Court’s opinions 
surrounding the use of CCTs). 
 43. The point is that the Katz Court’s opinion can be described as and ascribed to privacy—
the opinion can of course be seen as preserving privacy to a greater extent than did the previous 
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 42 [2009], Iss. 3, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol42/iss3/6
11-HALLIBURTON_COPYFORPRINTER_FINAL.DOC 4/27/2009  12:44 PM 
2009] HOW PRIVACY KILLED KATZ 811 
or if it had not simply cast aside the old property-driven regime44 for the 
new privacy-based era too hastily.  Indeed, it appears that the Court may 
not have meant what we read it to say in Katz,45 and that a property-
based theory of the Fourth Amendment was still viable even post-Katz.46  
Even if this theory cannot be conclusively proven, it is clear that 
privacy’s useful normative lifetime has run its course, and that in order 
to preserve constitutional and social integrity, the Court needs to commit 
itself to a new Fourth Amendment principle. 
This Article suggests that the search for a new concept of Fourth 
Amendment freedoms able to carry us into the future actually requires us 
to look back at the past and reinvigorate the notion of property forsaken 
in Katz.  There are several scholarly critiques of Katz’s privacy norm,47 
and even a few scholars who have postulated that the Fourth 
Amendment embraces at least some limited constitutionalized property 
right.48  However, none of these critiques, whether property driven or 
 
regime—but privacy does not explain or justify the steps taken to reach that desired outcome. 
 44. In Katz, the Court explicitly rejected the argument that Fourth Amendment rights are 
perfectly co-extensive with property interests, and introduced privacy as a notion that might 
transcend such limitations.  See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 45. See infra Part I.C (arguing that portions of the Katz opinion explain that the decision does 
not solely rest on privacy grounds). 
 46. See infra Part I.C (noting that the Katz opinion is based on several decisions that 
emphasize property rights under the Fourth Amendment). 
 47. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 
933 n.35 (2005) (“As a practical matter . . . defendants virtually always claim to have a subjective 
expectation of privacy, and the courts rarely second-guess those representations about the 
defendant’s state of mind.  When courts do discuss the first prong, their analysis sometimes invokes 
the ‘reasonableness’ issues that ought to be analyzed under the second prong . . . . The second prong 
of Katz, the so-called objective prong, is therefore the locus of most of the action under Fourth 
Amendment law.”); see also David W. Cunis, Note, California v. Greenwood: Discarding the 
Traditional Approach to the Search and Seizure of Garbage, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 543, 565 (1989) 
(observing that the Court in four cases has quickly glossed over the question raised by the first 
prong in Katz); Jon E. Lemole, Note, From Katz to Greenwood: Abandonment Gets Recycled from 
the Trash Pile—Can Our Garbage Be Saved from the Court’s Rummaging Hands?, 41 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 581, 595 n.92, 601 (1991) (noting that the Court usually accepts as fact a defendant’s 
assertion of a subjective expectation of privacy); James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy’s 
Sake: Toward an Expanded Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 
645, 651-54, 679-80 (1985) (noting that Katz’s first prong has become decreasingly important 
relative to its second prong). 
 48. See generally Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth 
Amendment, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 46 (1960) (tracing the developments that resulted in interpreting 
the Fourth Amendment to afford greater protection to property rights than to personal liberty); 
Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or Security?, 33 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 333-36 (1998) (stating that the Court has too readily made privacy 
expectations contingent on technology, empiricism, and government regulation, highlighting the 
problem of relying on privacy to define a person’s protected interest rather than property rights). 
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not, has adequately conceptualized the nature of the right to property that 
we must use to reform our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
What privacy advocates and even the rare property proponents have 
failed to do is appreciate the scope of the property rights a reinvigorated 
Fourth Amendment could embrace, and the complex relationship those 
rights have to conceptions of personhood.  This is the gap filled by the 
present Article in order to erase this blind spot in the normative debate 
surrounding the Fourth Amendment.  This Article seeks for the very first 
time to inform that debate with a notion of property as an essential 
aspect of human identity in a “mash-up”49 of sorts that might be called 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence meets the Radinesque Property of 
Personhood.50 
Using an expanded version of the notion of property developed by 
Professor Margaret Radin in her pioneering work Property and 
Personhood,51 the Fourth Amendment must contend with the social 
reality that some aspects of “ownership” or entitlement to property, and 
some level of vindication of those interests, are essential to the formation 
and viability of complete human beings.52  Such an expanded notion of 
property avoids all the pitfalls associated with the trespassory property 
concepts criticized in Katz.53  This expanded notion of property, 
enjoying an explicit foundation in the constitutional text,54 is in fact 
 
49. Mashup is a musical genre which, in its purest form, consists of the combination 
(usually by digital means) of the music from one song with the acappella from another.  
Typically, the music and vocals belong to completely different genres.  At their best, 
[mashup] songs strive for musical epiphanies that add up to considerably more than the 
sum of their parts.   
The Bastard Art Gallery, http://www.bastard-art-gallery.com/navigator.php (last visited Dec. 20, 
2008).  See also “Mashup,” The Free Dictionary, http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/mash-
up (last visited Dec. 20, 2008). 
 50. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957 (1982) 
(“The premise underlying the personhood perspective is that to achieve proper self-development—
to be a person—an individual needs some control over resources in the external environment.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See generally id. (exploring the complicated relationship between personhood and 
property, specifically in the context of legal thought). 
 53. This is because a personhood model of property does not conceptually depend on trespass 
or physical invasion to establish a violation of such rights, but rather focuses on whether a particular 
approach to regulating or structuring property relationships interferes or is incompatible with 
recognized individual interests in what Radin calls “personal property.”  See id. at 959; see also 
infra Part III.A (providing a fuller explanation of this aspect of the personhood model).  The point is 
that such interference can certainly occur even if there is no physical invasion or trespass against the 
unit of property in which a person has legitimately invested a sense of self. 
 54. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV; U.S. CONST. amend. V.  Most specifically, I note 
that our constitutional democracy explicitly guarantees our interests in “life, liberty, and property” 
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more authentic to the aspiration of the Bill of Rights.55  This idea is 
further buttressed by constitutional interpretive frameworks that 
emphasize holism and constitutional consistency.56  Finally, the 
proffered Fourth Amendment property right conceptualized and 
advanced in this Article produces superior outcomes in disputed cases 
compared to the privacy approach,57 and consequently would produce a 
more credible and coherent body of judicial opinion.58  Perhaps most 
important of all, focusing on a notion of property in the Fourth 
Amendment setting makes us more free: by preserving our cognitive 
freedom against encroachment, and through more consistent and 
aggressive policing of constitutionally-protected zones of exclusion, the 
proposed property rights model of the Fourth Amendment theorized here 
would be a liberty-preserving device that correlates with the needs and 
mores of the society it serves. 
The present effort to vindicate these claims proceeds in three 
principal parts.  Part I briefly traces the Fourth Amendment’s59 historical 
approach of analyzing Fourth Amendment claims by reference to 
property rights and common law prohibitions on trespass against 
property.  Part I also presents the Katz Court’s privacy-based response to 
that historical approach.  While this Part explores the possibility that 
Katz does not stand for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment deals 
only with privacy to the exclusion of property, it concludes by 
emphasizing that, at present, privacy rules the Fourth Amendment roost.  
Part II takes on this privacy-centric Fourth Amendment and considers 
the extent to which it might preserve the mental solitude and freedom of 
thought that is fundamental to so many of our personal and social 
dynamics.  Following this practical analysis, which reaches negative 
conclusions about privacy’s utility, are further discussions of the 
normative weakness of the privacy regime and of the jurisprudential 
 
against deprivation without due process by either the federal or state government. 
 55. One of the primary intentions of this Article, although not the immediate or explicit 
doctrinal focus, is to restore the Fourth Amendment to its preferred position within the 
constitutional framework by reconnecting it to the freedom-preserving spirit of the Bill of Rights.  
This allows us to consider Fourth Amendment freedoms as an essential component of the 
aggregated rights and obligations that characterize our constitutional or civic existence rather than 
as efficiency considerations relevant only to domestic policing activities. 
 56. This interpretive advantage is explored more fully in Part II.A. 
 57. See generally infra Part III.C.1.  
 58. See generally infra Part III.C.1 (arguing that the person property model is superior 
compared to the current privacy model of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). 
 59. See infra Part I.A (describing the early Supreme Court cases that focused on a property 
analysis as compared to the later Supreme Court cases that focused on privacy). 
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sleight-of-hand necessary to support it.  Part III then presents the 
argument that if we did demote (but not entirely discard) privacy, and 
installed a robust respect for the property of personhood in its place, it 
would restore the vitality and authenticity of the Fourth Amendment.  
This final part develops Radin’s personal property model, offers several 
conceptual enhancements to that model necessary to adapt it to the 
Fourth Amendment, and then applies this enhanced theory to CCTs and 
a series of other Fourth Amendment issues in order to demonstrate the 
value of this proposed reform. 
II.  FROM PROPERTY TO PRIVACY 
A.  Pre-Katz Fourth Amendment History 
For what is still a majority of the Fourth Amendment’s lifetime, the 
law treated it as having nothing to do with privacy.60  Indeed, far from 
regulating police forces or broadly limiting official intrusions, with or 
without a warrant, the Fourth Amendment merely served as a procedural 
device that laid out the steps investigators had to take in order to receive 
judicial approval to engage in either search or seizure activity.61  In this 
 
 60. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (explaining how, even though it 
was enacted in 1791, the Fourth Amendment did not affect privacy in any functional way until 
1967). 
 61. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 771-72 
(1996).  Amar stated bluntly: 
The Amendment’s Warrant Clause does not require, presuppose, or even encourage 
warrants—it limits them.  Unless warrants meet certain strict standards, they are per se 
unreasonable.  The Framers did not exalt warrants, for a warrant was issued ex parte by a 
government official on the imperial payroll and had the purpose and effect of precluding 
any common law trespass suit the aggrieved target might try to bring before a local jury 
after the search or seizure occurred. 
Id.  A somewhat parallel argument has been made with respect to the Fifth Amendment.  Eben 
Moglen’s historical discussion of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination is meant to 
show that early colonial versions of the privilege, and the eventual federal distillation of the colonial 
provisions, were meant only to restrict a very narrow set of practices and were neither construed nor 
applied to vest a criminal defendant with a general right to withhold information.  See Eben Moglen, 
Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1086, 1094 (1992) (“The[ ] elements of colonial criminal 
procedure demonstrate that American legal systems at the turn of the eighteenth century conformed 
to the model of the ‘accused speaks’ trial, with which the notion of an accused's right to silence in 
the face of the evidence was incompatible.”).  Amar’s argument about the Fourth Amendment’s 
warrant clause and Moglen’s argument about the Fifth Amendment’s privilege are both meant to 
suggest that the Amendments have an historical meaning very different from what they appear to 
say on their face.  The difficulty with these types of historical assessments, which measure modern 
doctrine against colonial and early American procedures, is that they limit the meaning of the 
12
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light, the Fourth Amendment functioned in its earliest days as the direct 
post-Colonial response to the hated writs of assistance so abused by the 
English crown.62  With passage of the Fourth Amendment, early 
lawmakers did away with general warrants and ensured that probable 
cause was the sole standard of suspicion that allowed the government to 
forcibly override an individual’s desire to remain undisturbed by the 
government.63  However, the Fourth Amendment did not initially operate 
 
constitutional text based on the founding generation’s occasional but not infrequent failure to live 
up to its newly codified ideals.  Rather than suggesting a narrow or even hobbled “originalist” view 
of the Fourth or Fifth Amendment, colonial and early American practices seemingly inconsistent 
with a broad construction of the text (and with subsequent liberal construction of the text by the 
Court) may depict nothing more than a system slow to change its ways.  The disconnect that Amar 
and Moglen describe, that between modern treatment of constitutional texts and the practices 
prevailing at the time of their adoption, is not at all unique in the field of constitutional 
interpretation and decision-making—religious discrimination after passage of the First Amendment, 
racial subordination after passage of the Civil War Amendments, and even basic denials of the right 
to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment are all examples of the same dynamic, and yet none 
of these infringing behaviors are legitimately used to argue against the clear import of the 
underlying legal provision. 
     Perhaps more so than constraining the meaning of these Amendments to mirror their initial 
application, the disconnect that Amar and Moglen convincingly describe may best be explained by 
the absence of an effective exclusionary remedy for violation of these rights, one which was capable 
of incentivizing if not forcing compliance with the newly-adopted constitutional requirements.  For 
a discussion of how a properly-designed exclusionary rule is essential if the Constitution’s criminal 
procedure provisions are to be given full force (or even taken seriously), see Christian M. 
Halliburton, Leveling the Playing Field: A New Theory of Exclusion for a Post-PATRIOT Act 
America, 70 MO. L. REV. 519 (2005). 
 62. See Amar, supra note 61, at 767 (“At common law . . . [e]ven if a constable had no 
warrant, and only weak or subjective grounds for believing someone to be a felon . . . the constable 
could seize the suspected person . . . .”); Bruce A. Antkowiak, Saving Probable Cause, 40 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 569, 573 (2007) (arguing that the probable cause doctrine plays a greater role in the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment than the warrant requirement due to the fact that, historically, 
the warrant requirement lacked substantial value, and there now exist numerous exceptions to the 
rule); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (1994) [hereinafter Maclin, Fourth Amendment] (proposing that the Framers 
established a warrant requirement as a check on executive power); Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping 
Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. 
L. REV. 895, 941-43, 966-77 (2002) [hereinafter Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie] (finding that, 
although the text of the Fourth Amendment bans only the use of general warrants, its broad 
implications include protecting citizens from overreaching authority by the government); Robert J. 
McWhirter, Molasses and the Sticky Origins of the Fourth Amendment, 43 ARIZ. ATT’Y 16, 32-34 
(2007) (summarizing the various lessons history has taught us about the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, including the fact that the reasonableness clause provides greater insight than the 
warrant clause because a search pursuant to a warrant does not necessarily protect a person’s right 
to be secure from his government). 
 63. See Amar, supra note 61, at 767-68 (detailing situations in which a warrant requirement 
simply makes no sense, such as when there are exigent circumstances justifying a search or when 
government agents receive uncoerced consent to search a place); see also Antkowiak, supra note 
62, at 573-74 (categorizing the warrant requirement as watered down and lacking strength); Maclin, 
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as any sort of independent check on government conduct or as a 
fundamental individual right observed during all law enforcement 
encounters.64 
This rather narrow view of the Fourth Amendment did not persist 
long.65  By 1886, when the Court decided Boyd v. United States,66 
American law had wholly abandoned the purely procedural view of the 
Fourth Amendment.67  It had come to embrace that provision of the Bill 
of Rights as creating affirmative, overarching individual rights that limit 
the spheres of permissible law enforcement conduct generally, and 
certainly not only when seeking magisterial approval on a warrant 
application.68  However, declaring the broad applicability and individual 
nature of the right was not enough.  The questions that still needed 
answering were:  (1) to what rights are Fourth Amendment freedoms 
instrumental,69 and (2) what is the legal or social value vindicated by the 
specific rights enumerated in the text of the amendment? 
At first glance, the Court’s opinion in Boyd appears to offer 
conflicting guidance.  For example, Justice Bradley takes care to unpack 
the language of search and seizure by placing the challenged practices 
 
Fourth Amendment, supra note 62, at 9 (questioning how the Framers would respond to current 
issues in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence such as undercover informants and the so-called “knock 
and announce” rule); Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie, supra note 62, at 903 (examining the 
complexities surrounding the use of history to analyze the true meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 
including the issue of when such a use of history is appropriate); McWhirter, supra note 62, at 27-
28 (analyzing the angry reaction of the colonies to the King of England’s issuing of Writs of 
Assistance—which acted as general search warrants—to enforce the Molasses Act). 
 64. See Amar, supra note 61, at 767 (“For example, less than a dozen years after the adoption 
of the Constitution and the ratification of the Bill of Rights, Congress passed and federal judges 
upheld the now-infamous Sedition Act.”); Antkowiak, supra note 62, at 578 (“The Founders drafted 
the Amendment to curtail the capricious search powers exercised under general warrants and writs 
of assistance . . . .”); Maclin, Fourth Amendment, supra note 62, at 11 (“The [Fourth] Amendment 
was a symbolic response to a tradition and historical period that showed scant respect for individual 
privacy.”); Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie, supra note 62, at 905 (setting forth the purposes for the 
announcement rule under common law: “it decreased the potential for violence; it protected a 
home’s privacy; and it prevented the physical destruction of the home”); McWhirter, supra note 62, 
at 32 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is significantly harder to meet 
than the general warrants issued under the Crown). 
 65. Although roughly one hundred years may seem like a long time, because of the 
exceptionally limited nature of the colonial constable’s authority to intrude upon personal affairs, 
the Fourth Amendment was not commonly invoked or involved in legal disputes.  Indeed, the Boyd 
opinion is the first fully reported opinion in which the Court used the Fourth Amendment as an 
analytical tool in the process of judicial decision-making.  See generally Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 616 (1886). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 623. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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within the historical experience of American colonials, and by linking 
the Fourth Amendment to the English practices to which they 
strenuously objected.70  Justice Bradley’s review of available authority 
settles on Lord Camden’s opinion in Entick v. Carrington71 “as the true 
and ultimate expression of constitutional law,” one which was “in the 
minds of those who framed the Fourth Amendment to the constitution, 
and . . . considered as sufficiently explanatory of what was meant by 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”72 
According to Camden, “[t]he great end for which men entered into 
society was to secure their property,”73 and “every invasion of private 
property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass.”74  Thus, in the case 
challenging the government’s forcible seizure of certain private papers, 
Camden recognized that the papers “are the owner’s goods and chattels; 
they are his dearest property; and are so far from enduring a seizure, that 
they will hardly bear an inspection . . . .”75  Consistent with the 
remainder of the Camden opinion, this language explicitly locates the 
claimant’s Fourth Amendment rights in his ownership status with 
respect to the seized items and the items’ status as property.76 
Justice Bradley begins with this property foundation and 
understands Camden’s opinion to mean that the constitutional guarantees 
of liberty and security under the Fourth Amendment “apply to all 
invasions on the part of the government and its employes [sic] of the 
sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.”77  This latter clause 
has been seized on as a possible indication that the interests inherent in 
 
 70. Id. at 624-25. 
 71. 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (C.P.D.) (1765), cited in Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626. 
 72. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626-27. 
 73. Id. at 627. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 627-28. 
 76. See id. (denying the right to inspect a person’s papers as a trespass on the person’s 
personal property). 
 77. Id. at 630. 
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the Fourth Amendment are matters of privacy, not property,78 or perhaps 
that property rules protect privacy interests instrumentally.79 
On closer examination, however, it becomes clear that the personal 
interest that invests the Fourth Amendment with its power and 
significance derives from an individual’s entitlement to own and control 
property.80 
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, 
that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his 
indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private 
property . . . it is the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and 
constitutes the essence of Lord Camden’s judgment.81 
 
 78. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987) (determining that the central 
component of the inquiry regarding what should be considered curtilage is “whether the area 
harbors the ‘intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man’s home and privacies of life’”) 
(quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 209 n.2 (1973) (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (stating that while the Bill of Rights does not reference privacy, the court has 
recognized that there should be no undue intrusion into the “privacies of life”); Warden, Md. 
Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967) (articulating the Fourth Amendment’s intent  to 
“protect against invasions of ‘the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life,’ from searches 
under indiscriminate, general authority”) (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630). 
 79. See Gregory S. Alexander, Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right? The German 
Example, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 735-36 (2003) (“Property once enjoyed an exalted status in 
American constitutional law[,]” but “[n]o modern Supreme Court decision has recognized a 
property right as fundamental for substantive due process purposes.”); see also Justin Stec, 
Comment, Why the Homeless Are Denied Personhood Under the Law: Toward Contextualizing the 
Reasonableness Standard in Search and Seizure Jurisprudence, 3 RUTGERS J.L. & URB. POL’Y 321, 
323 (2006) (“Without a home, a person lacks that presumption of privacy and liberty in law.  
Without a home, a person is forced to affirmatively prove an expectation of privacy—exactly the 
opposite of the homeowner or occupant of legitimized privacy space.”); Jeffery Lawrence Weeden, 
Note, Genetic Liberty, Genetic Property: Protecting Genetic Information, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 
611, 657 (2006) (“The myriad of principals now protected by privacy rights are in peril as long as 
they are anchored to privacy’s newly created, ill-defined, and ever-shifting principals instead of the 
bedrock of the time-tested rights and principles associated with property rights.”). 
 80. Justice Brandeis expressed this opinion in his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United 
States: 
The progress of science in furnishing the government with means of espionage is not 
likely to stop with wire-tapping.  Ways may some day be developed by which the 
Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, 
and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the 
home.  Advances in the psychic and related sciences may bring means of exploring 
unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions.  “That places the liberty of every man in the 
hands of every petty officer” was said by James Otis of much lesser intrusions than 
these.  To Lord Camden a far slighter intrusion seemed “subversive of all the comforts of 
society.”  Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of 
individual security? 
277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 81. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. 
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This is not to suggest that privacy is necessarily unimportant, but it 
is noticeably absent from the litany of sacred rights protected by the 
Fourth Amendment.82  Still, privacy has a recognized role to play in 
thinking about Fourth Amendment liberty and security.  The language 
quoted by Justice Bradley makes clear that “the secret [or private] nature 
of those goods [seized by the government] will be an aggravation of the 
trespass, and demand more considerable damages in that respect.”83  
This interaction between property rights and personal privacy is, 
arguably, the premise behind Boyd’s “privacies of life” phrase, reflecting 
one of the “circumstances of aggravation” in an official interference with 
private property.84  Thus, while the language may weakly suggest some 
privacy concern, this first functional Fourth Amendment opinion in the 
post-ratification era certainly grounded itself within a property rights 
framework. 
This intimation was not lost on succeeding courts or commentators.  
During the period between the decision in Boyd and the opinion in Katz, 
there was an unbroken and unequivocal resort to property rights theories 
in Fourth Amendment opinions, whether they dealt with application of 
the Fourth Amendment to a particular case or with the availability of 
Fourth Amendment protections as a threshold matter.85  Threaded 
through these cases, there is a debate about the scope of that protection,86 
 
 82. See id. (listing the rights of personal security, personal liberty, and private property as the 
sacred rights protected by the Fourth Amendment). 
 83. Id. at 628 (emphasis added). 
 84. Indeed, it may be argued that privacy is essentially an interest abstracted from property 
rights.  The “bundle of sticks” metaphor for thinking about the contours of property rights would 
suggest privacy is simply one of the sticks.  While this simple statement of the derivative nature of 
privacy might seem to be inherently regressive because it is valuable only to property owners, 
property law embraces far more than ownership entitlements alone, and includes such concepts as 
leaseholds and tenancies.  Thus, the stick in the bundle representing privacy would not be restricted 
to solely property owners, and can be seen as a broad societal interest which nevertheless may owe 
its existence to the right to own and control property. 
 85. See generally Griswold v. State of Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (including, within the right 
to privacy, the right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property); Rios v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960) (remanding a lower court decision for a determination of whether 
officers satisfied the Fourth Amendment requirements for seizing the defendant’s property); Jones 
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Salvucci, 448 
U.S. 83 (1980) (asserting that restrictions on searches and seizures were intended to protect against 
state invasion of “privacy and the security of property”); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 
251 U.S. 385 (1920) (reversing a district court decision to allow the government to use copies of 
documents taken in violation of the Fourth Amendment as evidence because the Constitution 
protected the defendants’ physical possession of the items and forbade the government from using 
any advantage gained by violating the right to posses the items). 
 86. Compare Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963) (holding that use of electronic 
device to enable government agents to overhear conversation that would have been beyond the 
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and the line drawn between the individual and the state periodically 
shifted.87  Yet, in each of these cases, seminal and mundane, the 
questions of what and how the Fourth Amendment protects were 
answered by reference to the contours of the claimant’s right to own, 
control, and direct disposition of property.88 
B.  The Katz Revolution: Was Privacy Really the Point? 
This is the legacy, in terms of judicial decision, that the Katz Court 
inherited, and the backdrop against which it would cast its soon-to-be 
announced privacy regime.  In fact, the Katz Court was explicitly aware 
that the Fourth Amendment had been construed with an emphasis on 
property rights,89 and that was the strict approach the Court sought to 
avoid.90  The Katz Court, therefore, famously began its analysis with the 
 
reach of the human ear does not violate rights under the Fourth Amendment when the electronic 
device has not been planted by an unlawful physical invasion of a constitutionally protected area), 
with McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372 (1960) (analyzing the nature, extent, character, and 
objects of the permissible scope of material that could be reasonably sought when a congressional 
subcommittee made an inquiry into whether there had been Communist activity in vital defense 
area), and Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963) (stating that the Fourth Amendment “is to be 
liberally construed and all owe the duty of vigilance for its effective enforcement lest there shall be 
impairment of the rights for the protection of which it was adopted”) (quoting Go-Bart Importing 
Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931)). 
 87. See generally Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 142 (1962) (holding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment extends the Fourth Amendment’s protection to conduct of officials of any state); Frank 
v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365-66 (1959) (stating that “[w]hile these concerns for individual rights 
[to be secure from searches for evidence to be used in criminal prosecutions or for forfeitures] were 
the historic impulses behind the Fourth Amendment and its analogues in state constitutions, the 
application of the Fourth Amendment and the extent to which the essential right of privacy is 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are . . . not restricted within 
these historic bounds”); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957) (holding that the generative 
principles of the Bill of Rights of the Federal Constitution do not, through the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, extend the protections of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to a 
criminal prosecution in state court). 
 88. For example, in Olmstead v. United States, the Court held that the absence of physical 
penetration foreclosed further Fourth Amendment inquiry.  277 U.S. at 466.  Similarly, in Goldman 
v. United States the Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment was not violated when the 
defendant’s conversation was overheard from another room.  316 U.S. 129, 133 (1942).  Finally, in 
Silverman v. United States the Court adhered to a strict application of trespass and affirmed 
Goldman, holding that a listening device did trespass because it made contact with a heating duct 
serving the defendant’s house.  365 U.S. 505, 510-11 (1961). 
 89. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)  (“[O]nce it is recognized that the 
Fourth Amendment protects people—and not simply ‘areas’—against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or 
absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.”). 
 90. See id. (rejecting the narrow view that surveillance without any trespass and without the 
seizure of any material object fell outside the domain of the Constitution). 
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recognition that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”91  
This protected core does not embrace “[w]hat a person knowingly 
exposes to the public,”92 but it does shroud “what he seeks to preserve as 
private, even in an area accessible to the public.”93 
This focus on the person and the scope of privacy represented a 
shift away from the traditional approach.  Both parties in Katz argued the 
case by asking whether a seizure requires a physical invasion and 
whether a phone booth was a “constitutionally protected” space,94 but 
only because this was the framework established by precedent at that 
time.95  With the succinct comment regarding the beneficiary of Fourth 
Amendment protections (“people, not places”), Justice Stewart’s opinion 
deftly disposed of the debate over constitutionally protected spaces.96 
Resolving the debate over the government’s physical invasion 
argument required two subsidiary steps.  First, the Court had to contend 
with the line of cases (building on Boyd) that limited Fourth Amendment 
application to those situations expressly involving common law trespass 
or other physical transgression of a recognizable boundary.97  “It is true 
that the absence of such penetration [in these cases] was . . . thought to 
foreclose further Fourth Amendment inquiry.”98  “But ‘[t]he premise that 
property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize 
has been discredited.’”99  To the extent that conflicting cases remained 
on the books, Katz declared that “the ‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated 
can no longer be regarded as controlling.”100 
Second, the Court needed to deal with the conventional position 
that, given the nature of the Fourth Amendment’s phrasing, it only 
 
 91. Id. at 351. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See id. (“[T]he parties have attached great significance to the characterization of the 
telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls.  The petitioner has strenuously argued 
that the booth was a ‘constitutionally protected area.’  The Government has maintained with equal 
vigor that it was not.”). 
 95. Id. at 351, 351 n.9 (acknowledging that the Court had previously described the problem in 
terms of “constitutionally protected areas,” but stating that by focusing on “whether or not a given 
‘area’ . . . [was] ‘constitutionally protected,’ . . . [the parties were] deflect[ing] attention from the 
problem presented by this case”). 
 96. See id. at 351 (declaring that the Fourth Amendment protects people as well as areas). 
 97. See id. at 352 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464, 466 (1928)) 
(acknowledging that past Court decisions required a physical penetration to establish a Fourth 
Amendment violation). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 353 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 284, 304 (1967)). 
 100. Id. 
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guarded against seizure of tangible things.101  However, the Court had 
already “departed from the narrow view on which that decision rested.  
Indeed, [it] expressly held that the Fourth Amendment governs not only 
the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral 
statements . . . .”102  The substantive innovation of Katz was the 
recognition that the collapse of the tangible/intangible object distinction 
further eroded the legitimacy of the Fourth Amendment’s historical 
trespass doctrine.103  This erosion of trespass severed the final link 
between the Fourth Amendment and property rights forged by Boyd, and 
led to the most famous aspect of Katz, articulated in Justice Harlan’s 
concurring opinion.104  Thereafter, Fourth Amendment protections 
would be tested by “a twofold requirement, first that a person have 
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that 
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”105 
The change announced, or at least invited, by Katz manifested 
almost right away.  From the date of the Katz decision forward, the 
Supreme Court has consistently evaluated Fourth Amendment claims 
and resolved Fourth Amendment interpretive moments by reference to 
some form of the Katz expectation of privacy standard.106  It is now 
hornbook boilerplate to say that the key issue under the Fourth 
Amendment is “what expectations of privacy are constitutionally 
‘justifiable.’”107  From courts to legislators to scholars, the general and 
 
 101. Id. at 353 (asserting that the Court previously departed from the former view that the 
Fourth Amendment only guarded against seizures of tangible items). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. (rejecting the Government’s contention that the Fourth Amendment should not apply 
to the surveillance of Katz due to the lack of physical penetration of the phone booth because the 
“trespass” doctrine was too eroded to be controlling). 
 104. See id. at 361 (Harland, J., concurring) (stating that the Fourth Amendment protects places 
where a person has shown a subjective expectation of privacy and that society believes the 
expectation is reasonable). 
 105. Id. 
 106. See generally Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) (holding that defendants, who 
were in another person’s apartment for a short period of time solely for the purpose of packaging 
cocaine, had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 
207, 213-14 (1986) (holding that warrantless aerial observation of fenced-in backyard within the 
curtilage of home was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the yard was 
observable to any person traveling by air); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) 
(holding that installation and use of a pen register by a telephone company does not constitute a 
“search” because the content of the communication was not obtained and one could not have a 
reasonable expectation that the phone number dialed would remain private). 
 107. See, e.g. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (declaring that undercover 
surveillance employing remote electronic surveillance did not implicate a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, and thus was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). 
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largely unchallenged consensus is that privacy is paramount to Fourth 
Amendment freedom. 
Such unreflective or uncritical invocations of privacy, or of any 
socio-legal construct, make me nervous.  This is particularly so when a 
constitutional norm operates to restrict rather than augment liberty,108 
and where deployment of the norm in analytical situations is destructive 
of the social dynamics nominally elevated to normative significance.109  
In the pages that follow, I argue that this is true of privacy:  it has been 
used to justify increasingly severe intrusions upon personal freedom, and 
it has produced a jurisprudence that is hostile to personal privacy, 
intimacy, and confidentiality.  Far from proving that now, my purpose 
here is only to suggest several intuitions or motivations for exploring 
whether, notwithstanding what Katz said, privacy really is or should be 
the point of the Fourth Amendment. 
C.  Post-Katz Interpretive Options 
There is ample room, both within the Katz opinion and within the 
larger doctrinal discourse, to argue that Katz does not stand for the 
proposition that the Fourth Amendment protects only reasonable 
expectations of privacy and cannot be understood by reference to 
property rights models.  First, the Katz opinion itself is far from absolute 
 
 108. See John W. Whitehead & Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting “Enduring Freedom” for 
“Homeland Security”: Constitutional Analysis of the USA Patriot Act and the Justice Department’s 
Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1081, 1108 (2002) (discussing how, despite the 
heightened protection under Katz, wiretaps to record private conversations are “virtually never 
denied”); see also Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust 
Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1757 (1994) (describing privacy as 
the “counterweight” that is “placed on the other side of the scale against the government’s interest 
in deciding whether a search was ‘reasonable,’” which opens the door “for a variety of government 
intrusions that lacked individualized probable cause under traditional Warrant Clause analysis but 
could now be approved if the Court found that the government’s need made the intrusion on privacy 
‘reasonable’”). 
 109. See Patrick Haines, Embracing the DNA Fingerprint Act, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. 
L. 629, 649 (2007) (“Even if society does recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in an 
arrestee’s DNA fingerprint under Katz, a Fourth Amendment balancing test that weighs the 
government’s legitimate and narrowly tailored interest in obtaining DNA fingerprints against the 
arrestee’s diminished privacy interest should favor the government.”); Mark G. Milone, Biometric 
Surveillance: Searching For Identity, 57 BUS. LAW. 497, 507-08 (2001) (arguing that “as 
sophisticated technologies with the ability to secretly invade privacy become widely utilized 
Constitutional privacy protection diminishes”); Christopher Slobogin, The Liberal Assault on the 
Fourth Amendment, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 603, 605 (2007) (arguing how Katz, once hailed as a 
major enhancement of constitutional protection against government intrusion, has become the 
stepping stone to many of the privacy-diminishing holdings of the Court). 
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in its emphasis on the former to the exclusion of the latter.110  In fact, at 
the beginning of the opinion, the Court cautions against using the Fourth 
Amendment as a “general constitutional ‘right to privacy.’”111  The 
Fourth Amendment “protects individual privacy against certain kinds of 
governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have 
nothing to do with privacy at all.”112  It is interesting to note that, when 
the Court refers to these other Fourth Amendment interests having 
nothing to do with privacy, the first interest cited is a right to property.113 
Katz may also be seen as building on an idea of privacy earlier set 
forth in Warden v. Hayden,114 and Katz relies on Warden for the premise 
that privacy, and not property, is the proper measure of the Fourth 
Amendment.115  Warden, in turn, relies extensively on Justice Bradley’s 
opinion in Boyd, but only insofar as Justice Bradley discussed the 
“privacies of life.”116  As discussed earlier, the “privacies of life” that 
were at issue in Boyd were those invested in and protected through the 
fundamental property rights that gave Boyd standing to challenge the 
government’s conduct.117 
The consequence of this is that the Katz opinion does not wholly 
require, nor justify, the shift from a property to a privacy perspective that 
we attribute to it.  The most salient aspects of the Katz Court’s analysis, 
and its true precedential value, are its rejection of the limitations of the 
 
 110. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (asserting that the Fourth 
Amendment does not grant a general right to privacy and that the Fourth Amendment’s protections 
go beyond privacy). 
 111. See id. at 350 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general 
constitutional ‘right to privacy.’”). 
 112. Id. (emphasis added). 
 113. See id. at 350 n.4 (asserting that the average person will be just as aggrieved if his 
property is seized openly as if it is seized “‘privately and by stealth’” (quoting Griswold v. State of 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting))). 
 114. 387 U.S. 284 (1967). 
 115. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (quoting Hayden, 387 U.S. at 304) (stating that the idea that 
property rights control the ability to search and seize is no longer credible). 
 116. As the Court stated in Hayden: 
We have examined on many occasions the history and purposes of the [Fourth] 
Amendment.  It was a reaction to the evils of the use of the general warrant in England 
and the writs of assistance in the Colonies, and was intended to protect against invasions 
of “the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life,” from searches under 
indiscriminate, general authority.  Protection of these interests was assured by 
prohibiting all “unreasonable” searches and seizures, and by requiring the use of 
warrants, which particularly describe “the place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized,” thereby interposing “a magistrate between the citizen and the police.” 
387 U.S. at 301 (citations omitted). 
 117. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (discussing the “indefeasible right of 
personal security, personal liberty, and private property”); see also supra Part I.A. 
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trespass doctrine and the refusal to invest any significance in the 
difference between tangible and intangible items.118  The trespass 
doctrine itself is not wholly irrelevant after Katz because Katz merely 
held that a trespass is not necessary to trigger the Fourth Amendment, 
but it nowhere stated that it is insufficient.119  In fact, property-related 
spatial considerations are logically intertwined with the Katz rule 
regarding the Fourth Amendment because “[g]enerally . . . the answer to 
th[e] question [whether the Fourth Amendment in fact protects a person] 
requires reference to a ‘place.’”120 
With these considerations in mind, it becomes more difficult to 
follow Katz and proponents of the case’s unidimensionality down the 
primrose path.  A very real possibility exists, to this day, that Katz has 
been misused as authority to divorce property notions from the Fourth 
Amendment’s doctrinal structure, and that property retains this now 
apocryphal significance.  Yet this is no more than a possibility, and 
perhaps no more conclusive than the framework it seeks to displace, but 
I do think this interpretation of Katz is far more defensible than reducing 
it to a simple privacy-over-property binary.  What seems inescapable, 
however, is that if Katz has been correctly interpreted and applied over 
the past forty years, continued reliance on that conventional 
interpretation is, and perhaps always was, manifest error when 
considered from a normative rather than instrumentalist perspective. 
III.  THE PROBLEM WITH PRIVACY 
What is the problem with privacy?  If Katz did indeed transform the 
Fourth Amendment into a constitutionalized right to demand respect for 
certain expectations of privacy, what is the big deal? 
It is certainly true that Fourth Amendment privacy considerations, 
in some instances, have been effective in providing the protections that 
meet our constitutional and social expectations.121  A prime example of 
 
 118. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (adopting the previous departure from the idea that the Fourth 
Amendment only covered the seizure of tangible property). 
 119. See generally id. (asserting that the Fourth Amendment extends beyond the trespass on 
tangible goods, but not stating that the Fourth Amendment excludes trespass on tangible goods). 
 120. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 121. See Mary Helen Wimberly, Rethinking the Substantive Due Process Right to Privacy: 
Grounding Privacy in the Fourth Amendment, 60 VAND. L. REV. 283, 299-300 (2007) (stating that 
“[i]n its pivotal 1965 decision, Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court elevated the right to 
privacy beyond statutory and tort law into the realm of constitutional protection”).  See generally 
Omar Saleem, The Physics of Fourth Amendment Privacy Rights, 32 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 147 
(2007).  In an interesting analysis of how law and science share traits of rationality, a quest for 
universality, and theoretical evolution, Saleem articulates how the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
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this is the Court’s aggressive restriction on violations of the sanctity of 
the home.122  Proceeding on the assumption that privacy interests are 
nowhere more compelling than in a person’s residential domestic space, 
the Court has maintained the most rigorous version of the warrant 
preference, and has allowed only minimal slippage under its 
reasonableness alternative to the warrant clause when compared to the 
use of the reasonableness construct elsewhere.123 
Still, the Court’s Fourth Amendment privacy rationale is subject to 
regular attack from both sides of the ideological spectrum.  For example, 
legitimate criticism has been leveled at the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence based on its a-textual or contra-textual interpretive 
approach.124  The Fourth Amendment, according to this argument, says 
nothing about privacy, and where the Fourth Amendment does speak it 
emphasizes aspects or repositories for personal behavior that are 
separate and distinct from an amorphous right to privacy.125  
 
Katz and the subsequent application of the two-prong objective-subjective analysis demonstrated a 
positive variance from absolutism to fluidity.  Id. 
 122. Given the Court’s treatment, the home can be seen as one of the constitutionally created 
zones of exclusion described earlier.  See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) 
(citation omitted) (applying the traditional view that a miniscule invasion of the home without a 
warrant, even though only by an external heat detecting device, violated the Fourth Amendment 
because all intimate details of a home are protected from government surveillance). 
 123. Compare Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981) (holding that “a warrant to 
search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to 
detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted”), and Muehler v. Mena, 
544 U.S. 93, 98-100 (2005) (concluding that officers acted reasonably by detaining occupant in 
handcuffs for two to three hours while a search of the home was in progress, given fact that warrant 
sought weapons and evidence of gang membership), with Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 
U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995) (allowing the random warrantless drug testing of student athletes as 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the invasion of privacy was minimal compared to 
the compelling government interest), and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (holding that a 
search must be “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in 
the first place”), and Camara v. Mun. Ct. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967) (denying the 
use of administrative building inspections without warrants to ensure compliance with city housing 
code). 
 124. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 373 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (“Since I 
see no way in which the words of the Fourth Amendment can be construed to apply to 
eavesdropping, that closes the matter for me. . . . I simply cannot in good conscience give a meaning 
to words which they have never before been thought to have and which they certainly do not have in 
common ordinary usage.  I will not distort the words of the Amendment in order to ‘keep the 
Constitution up to date’ or ‘to bring it into harmony with the times.’”); Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs 
Lie, supra note 62, at 899 (arguing that “a textual approach to constitutional decision-making, 
defining the scope of a constitutional right according to the ‘original intent’ of the Framers provides 
a cloak of objectivity for the Court’s rulings”); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional 
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 878 (1996) (noting that “[a]n air of illegitimacy surrounds 
any alleged departure from the text or the original understandings” of the Framers’ intent). 
 125. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (guaranteeing the right to security of persons, houses, papers, 
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Specifically, if the drafters meant to protect privacy in the Fourth 
Amendment, “persons, houses, papers and effects” would not be the 
language logically chosen to achieve that outcome.126 
From the other direction, many have faulted the privacy regime for 
allowing the Court to engage in wide-ranging social engineering,127 and 
to measure objective expectations of privacy by reference to their own 
subjective valuations of the privacy interest asserted.128  The result, it is 
claimed, is that the Fourth Amendment fails to protect privacy where 
ordinary objective people would actually expect it to intervene on their 
behalf.129 
I mean to suggest that both of these broad critiques are well-placed 
and well-deserved.  Part I of this Article traced the contours of potential 
bases that in some ways support the textualist rejection of privacy as the 
 
and effects, but without any mention of general “privacy”). 
 126. As one commentator has characterized the situation: 
The “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects” 
presupposes and conjures up tort law, which protects persons and property from 
unreasonable invasions. . . . [T]extual analysis is strongly supported by history–no 
framer ever argued for exclusion, nor did any early commentator, or judge–and by 
common sense: unlike tort law, exclusion rewards the guilty but gives absolutely zilch to 
the innocent citizen, whom the government seeks to hassle. 
Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 53, 64 (1996). 
 127. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 468 U.S. 1214, 1215 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Of late, 
the Court has acquired a voracious appetite for judicial activism in its Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, at least when it comes to restricting the constitutional rights of the citizen.”).  See 
generally Jeffrey M. Shaman, Constitutional Interpretation: Illusion and Reality, 41 WAYNE L. 
REV. 135, 136 (1994) (“Throughout its history, constitutional interpretation, particularly as 
practiced by the United States Supreme Court, has been characterized by two distinct modes of 
thought.  One, which was the predominant mode of constitutional adjudication during the Supreme 
Court’s first 150 years or so, can be referred to as ‘categorizing’ or ‘defining.’  The other mode of 
thought, developed more recently, is called ‘balancing.’  While categorization is a formal mode of 
thought, balancing is functional or realistic.”). 
 128. See Harvard Law Review Ass’n, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term: Administrative 
Searches: Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 92 HARV. L. REV. 210, 217 (1978) [hereinafter The Supreme 
Court, 1977 Term] (concluding that the analysis of reasonableness through a balancing test “offers 
no clear guidance for defining warrant exceptions, except perhaps to give greater sway to the 
judge’s subjective evaluation of the importance of the substantive regulation being enforced”).  See 
generally Joseph Ricchezza, Note, Are Undocumented Aliens “People” Persons Within the Context 
of the Fourth Amendment?, 5 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 475 (1991) (suggesting that subjective application 
of the Fourth Amendment results in lack of protection for undocumented aliens, which in turn 
serves to perpetuate a certain level of callousness toward the privacy rights of citizens, and 
eliminates much of the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule). 
 129. See The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, supra note 128, at 217 (arguing that a balancing test 
could allow judges to decide that the government’s enforcement needs outweigh the protective 
value of a warrant in almost any administrative or criminal case). 
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Fourth Amendment’s core concern.130  This present section takes on the 
second pragmatic argument and explores the toll privacy has taken on 
the level of liberty we might seek to ensure through the Constitution and 
its Fourth Amendment.  This section also explores the havoc that privacy 
has wrought on the system of law responsible for making the 
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment meaningful.  First, this 
exploration will look again at cognitive freedom and the concerns raised 
by CCTs, and suggest that a Fourth Amendment that does not keep the 
government out of your head is unworthy of our allegiance and should 
be put out to pasture posthaste.  This exploration will also look at the 
more general critiques of the privacy model that center on the model’s 
inability to adapt to new law enforcement techniques, and the limited 
utility of an objective expectations analysis in the face of such change.  
Finally, this part will describe the role privacy has played in producing 
analytically and intellectually suspect Supreme Court precedent, and the 
corrosive effect privacy has had on the coherency of the law of search 
and seizure.  The conclusion to be taken from these three strands of 
discussion is that privacy has thwarted the great potential of the Fourth 
Amendment to keep “the people” free from government overreaching.  
Privacy, as a normative commitment for the Fourth Amendment, is dead; 
and if it is not dead, it is time for us to kill it to end our collective 
suffering. 
A.  Lapse in Cognitive Freedom 
In a prelude to this present undertaking, I identified a class of 
innovative technologies that allow operators access to information 
residing and activities that occur solely within the brain of the examined 
subject (or target) to whom the technology is applied.131  Because they 
give broad substantive access to the contents of the cognitive 
environment, I call these cognitive camera technologies.132  The specific 
scientific bases of the myriad approaches vary, but they generally rely on 
medical diagnostic techniques, like magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), 
electroencephalography (EEG), near-infrared (NIR) and infrared (IR) 
light detection, and ocular thermography, which measure electrical 
 
 130. See supra Part I.A-B (describing the original pre-Katz focus on property rights as the 
impetus for the Fourth Amendment). 
 131. Halliburton, supra note 3, at 310 (identifying a number of technologies, such as EEG 
monitoring and fMRI that provide the ability to access “cognitive contents” for information-
gathering techniques such as Brain Fingerprinting). 
 132. See id. (referring to the technologies that allow access to “cognitive content” in a group as 
“Cognitive Camera Technologies” or “CCTs”). 
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brainwave activity, blood flow concentrations, and vascular changes, or 
some combination of the three.133  This information is increasingly 
susceptible of correlation and association with specific known behaviors, 
cognitive and emotional states, information exposure histories and, now, 
even to moral character and future decision-making probabilities.134 
A good representative of the basic CCT is the proprietary 
assessment method called Brain Fingerprinting.135  The Brain 
Fingerprinting technique involves simultaneous use of EEG and MRI to 
generate data that maps changes in the subject brain’s activity during 
display of deliberately selected slides, which are chosen for their 
relevance (or lack thereof) to the proposition being tested.136  For 
example, if investigators want to know if a suspect was at a crime scene 
at a particular time, they can show that suspect an image of the crime 
scene and determine, within approximately 300 milliseconds, whether 
that scene or image is new or known to that individual.137  The value of 
Brain Fingerprinting data is augmented by the fact that clinical studies 
have depicted what a lying brain and a truthful brain each look like, and 
they simply do not look the same.138  Brain Fingerprinting thus has two 
important functionalities:  first, it is a twenty-first century update on the 
old and unreliable polygraph;139 and second, it is a mind-probing device 
 
 133. See id. (listing a variety of technologies that “provide the power to peer behind the veil 
that keeps our thoughts . . . confidential” and therefore qualify as CCTs). 
 134. See Sara Solovitch, Mind Reader, LEGAL AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 66 (describing the 
potential of Brain Fingerprinting to assist in the investigation of crimes, free the innocent, combat 
terrorism, identify fraud, and diagnose brain disorders such as Alzheimer’s disease). 
 135. Halliburton, supra note 3, at 320-23 (outlining the ability of Brain Fingerprinting to 
determine whether a person knows specific information regardless of voluntary action or consent by 
the subject). 
 136. See generally id. (describing the process of Brain Fingerprinting and the data it produces).  
Sara Solovitch describes brain fingerprinting as follows: 
A headband of electrodes is placed on a subject, who watches words or pictures flash 
across a computer screen.  Some of the images are meant to stimulate memories, which 
cause the brain to fire off an electrical response 300 milliseconds after the stimulus . . . .  
The stimuli come in three categories: “target” stimuli (details of an activity that would be 
known to the subject), irrelevant stimuli (which would not be expected to elicit a 
response), and “probe” stimuli (phrases or pictures supposedly known only to a select 
few, like the perpetrator and investigators of a crime).  If a suspect exhibits a P300 
response to a probe stimulus, he is presumed guilty.  If not, he is presumed innocent. 
Solovitch, supra note 134. 
 137. Id. (recounting the process of Brain Fingerprinting, which includes the possibility of 
showing a criminal suspect a “probe” image and recording the subject’s brain response 300 
milliseconds after the image is shown). 
 138. See id. (referencing the work of two scientists that suggests that certain parts of the brain 
show increased activity when a subject is lying). 
 139. See, e.g., United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 312 (1998) (upholding an evidentiary 
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that can, under proper conditions, “read” your thoughts, whether you 
like it or not.140 
This presents a problem.  Non-consensual cognitive surveillance is 
simply incompatible with our, or perhaps with any, western democracy 
that shares in the Cartesian philosophical heritage141 or adopts Lockean 
natural law-based conceptions of individual autonomy.142  Cognitive 
surveillance presents a potentially far-reaching threat to our ability to 
compose a unique social self,143 to our prospects for religious or spiritual 
development,144 and may detract from the effectiveness of civic 
institutions by disempowering the rational political choice on which 
democratic political theory relies.145 
CCTs are antagonistic to these three areas of social inquiry because 
each centrally relies on notions of cognitive freedom—the liberty to 
think and imagine what one will, the absolute solitude of the mind, and 
the right to be left alone and unmolested in that literal and figurative 
space.  Post-Cartesian philosophy, the heart of the established western 
 
rule barring polygraph evidence from military trials because inherent doubts and uncertainties 
regarding the accuracy of every polygraph test and administrator’s interpretations render polygraph 
evidence unreliable). 
 140. See Solovitch, supra note 134 (describing the ability of Brain Fingerprinting to determine 
whether a suspect has committed a crime based on the nearly instantaneous and involuntary 
response of the subject’s brain to stimuli). 
 141. See generally René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, in 1 THE PHILOSOPHICAL 
WORKS OF DESCARTES 131-200 (Elizabeth S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross trans., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1968) (1641). 
 142. “Another classical view of the person makes the essential attributes self-consciousness 
and memory.  Locke defines a person as ‘a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, 
and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places.’  For Locke, 
memory signifies this continuous self-consciousness.  Locke’s theory still holds great appeal for 
those who puzzle over the mysteries of personal identity.”  Radin, supra note 50, at 963 (citing 
JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 280-81 (John W. Yolton ed., Dent 
1965) (1690)).  See also id. at 963 n.15-16 (citing Anthony Flew, Locke and the Problem of 
Personal Identity, in PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 61-80 (John Shosky ed., Rowman & Littlefield 1998) 
(1951) (critiquing Locke’s views on personhood); David Wiggins, Locke, Butler and the Stream of 
Consciousness: And Men as a Natural Kind, in THE IDENTITIES OF PERSONS 139, 149 (A. Rorty ed. 
1976) (augmenting Locke’s theory of the person and the construction of personal identity)). 
 143. See Halliburton, supra note 3, at 313 (declaring that the Constitution creates a number of 
zones of exclusion for areas that are essential to our fundamental human nature and that the non-
consensual use of CCT technologies breaches these protected areas); id. at 27-28 (arguing that the 
idea of an individual person in society keys upon the notion that there exists in each individual a 
unique “inner existence” that is unavailable to anyone outside of the individual). 
 144. See id. at 336-38 (asserting that free and individual thought is central to spiritual existence 
and that CCTs intrude on the role of religion in personal and communal life). 
 145. See id. at 338-40 (arguing that thought free from coercion on public policy issues is 
essential for democratic institutions and that CCTs could distort the political process because 
thought monitoring naturally curtails free thought and allows the enforcement of political 
orthodoxy). 
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canon,146 identifies the process of thinking as constitutive of being, and 
holds that the process of intellectual inquiry and discernment is what 
substantiates our existence.147  The fact that we have our own thoughts, 
which are unique to us and therefore not attributable to others, assures us 
that we “are.”148  Related to this, social or behavioral psychologists may 
debate the methods individuals use to create and perpetuate a subjective 
identity, but all agree that humanity requires an ability to distinguish the 
“I” recognized by an individual as herself from the collective “they” 
who surround her in her social context.149  Indeed, an unthinking brain is 
dehumanized—hence the term vegetable150—and an unindividuated 
brain is considered pathological, often derided in terms of mental illness, 
disease, or defect.151 
So too do considerations of religion and spirituality implicate our 
right to cognitive freedom and mental solitude.  At the heart of almost 
 
 146. See generally DESMOND CLARKE, DESCARTES: A BIOGRAPHY (2006) (discussing 
Descartes’s range of interests in theology, philosophy, and the sciences, and tracing his intellectual 
development throughout his life); STEPHEN GAUKROGER, DESCARTES: AN INTELLECTUAL 
BIOGRAPHY (1995) (outlining Descartes’s many fundamental insights into the nature of knowledge 
and the mind, which have been the basis for study and debate in the centuries since his death). 
 147. See THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO DESCARTES 141, 236 (John Cottingham ed., 1992) 
(analyzing Descartes’s claim to certainty about his thought and existence); Frank B. Dilley, Taking 
Consciousness Seriously: A Defense of Cartesian Dualism, 55 INT’L J. PHIL. RELIGION 135, 135-53 
(2004) (defending Cartesian dualism as it has been modified over time, claiming that a substance 
view of the self is required if we are to take consciousness as we actually experience it). 
 148. See Halliburton, supra note 3, at 313 (arguing that there is a broad social consensus on the 
right to a cognitive zone of exclusion, which the non-consensual use of CCTs intrudes upon by 
invading human thought, directly affecting human nature); id. at 333; see also RENÉ DESCARTES, 
DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD AND MEDIATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 21 (David Weissman ed., 
Yale Univ. Press 1996); MORRIS ROSENBERG, CONCEIVING THE SELF 5-51 (1986). 
 149. See Halliburton, supra note 3, at 332-35 (discussing the different theories of identity, each 
providing an individual identity relative to the external world); see also Michael S. Gazzaniga, The 
Split Brain Revisited, 279 SCI. AM. 50, (1998) (examining cases of patients whose separated 
cerebral hemispheres act as two semi-independent selves); Brent W. Roberts & Eileen M. Donahue, 
One Personality, Multiple Selves: Integrating Personality and Social Roles, 62 J. PERSONALITY 
199, 200-202 (1994) (associating behavior with role-specific conceptions of how to act formed over 
time through social context).  See generally H. GARDNER, MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES: THE THEORY 
IN PRACTICE 8-9 (Basic Books 1993) (discussing evidence for the existence of seven semi-
independent intelligences, such as logical-mathematical, linguistic, spatial, etc., which can be found 
in specific regions of the brain). 
 150. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1304 (10th ed. 1996). 
 151. See generally ALLAN V. HORWITZ, CREATING MENTAL ILLNESS 5-16 (2002) (arguing that 
our current understanding of mental illness as a disease actually fits only a relatively small number 
of problematic psychological conditions and that most conditions currently considered mental 
illness are merely “cultural constructions,” “normal reactions to stressful social circumstances,” or 
simply “forms of deviant behavior”); Peggy A. Thoits, On Merging Identity Theory and Stress 
Research, 54 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 101, 102-12 (1991) (applying theoretical work on social identity to 
an individual’s increased vulnerability to physical or psychological disorders). 
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every religious tradition is the dynamic of faith, a willingness to believe 
in divinity and grace in the absence of factual proof.152  Mental solitude 
is essential to the development of faith because it provides a basis or 
explanation for the need for the proverbial leap; we must have faith in 
what we experience internally because we could never prove it to the 
external world.153  However, faith, whatever its transcendent connection 
to the divine, may manifest in the material world as nothing more than a 
particular cognitive state.154  If people are not truly at liberty to think as 
they will, to let the mind wander even, they may be discouraged or 
prevented from thinking in those ways or generating those patterns of 
consciousness that comprise faith.155  In a related way, the revelatory 
aspect of prophet-based or messianic religions156 also relies on the 
construction of the mind as free and impenetrable—if it did not, then 
prophets would not need to convince their followers of the validity of 
their visions.  Moreover, religious practice in many traditions entails 
prayer157 or meditation,158 and the intimacy of this perceived 
 
 152. See Halliburton, supra note 3, at 336-37 (discussing religious mythology and its regular 
use of transcendent revelation as a means of conveying divine knowledge to worldly followers).  
See Ina Praetorius, Speaking of God as a Woman Since the Enlightenment, 15 FEMINIST THEOLOGY 
84, 88-90 (2006). 
 153. See Seth Holtzman, Science and Religion: The Categorical Conflict, 54 INT’L J. PHIL. 
RELIGION 77, 79-87 (2003) (discussing the role of empirical facts and internal beliefs in the conflict 
between science and religion); George Johnson, Ideas & Trends: True Believers; Science and 
Religion Cross Their Line in the Sand, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1998, § 4 at 41. 
 154. See generally MATTHEW ALPER, THE “GOD” PART OF THE BRAIN: A SCIENTIFIC 
INTERPRETATION OF HUMAN SPIRITUALITY AND GOD 227-28 (Sourcebooks 2006) (described by the 
publisher as presenting a “systematic, scientific argument that shows why belief in God is an 
inherent evolutionary mechanism that enables us to cope with our greatest, universal terror—
death”). 
 155. See Halliburton, supra note 3, at 333-34 (describing a person’s behavior and patterns as 
important factors philosophers use to illustrate the nature of the self).  See Linda Martin Alcoff, 
Habits of Hostility on Seeing Race, 44 PHIL. TODAY 30, 30-40 (2000) (addressing the mind in terms 
of perceiving race and physical features); Kim-chong Chong, Zhuangzi and the Nature of Metaphor, 
56 PHIL. E. & W. 370, 370-91 (2006); Deborah Cook, Nature Becoming Conscious of Itself: Adorno 
on Self-Reflection, 50 PHIL. TODAY 296, 296-306 (2006); James S. Hans, Alexander Nehamas and 
the Art of Living, 44 PHIL. TODAY 190, 190-205 (2000). 
 156. A definition of “Messiah” in the Oxford Dictionary of World Religions states: 
Although at an early date the followers of Jesus were marked out as those who believed 
that Jesus was the promised messiah/christ . . . Jesus appears to have resisted any attempt 
to interpret what he was doing and saying in his God-derived way through that 
category—to such an extent that it gave rise to the theory of the messianic secret . . . . 
Some aspects of his life (e.g. the entry into Jerusalem) were clearly open to the 
interpretation that he was acting as the descendant of David, but it was only after his 
death and resurrection that the appropriateness of interpreting him as messiah was 
developed . . . . 
THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF WORLD RELIGIONS 637 (John Bowker ed., 1997). 
 157. For example, in Christianity, prayer is an expression of wonder and a cry for help because 
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communication with the divine is essential to the value it presents to the 
individual.159  At every turn, the process and dynamics of spirituality or 
religiosity have their basis in the premises of cognitive liberty and 
conditions of mental solitude. 
Our cherished democratic political system makes precisely parallel 
assumptions in formulating the concept of the rational political actor,160 
and in relying on the aggregate expressions of informed political 
judgment to produce its ideal of true popular governance.161  Cognitive 
freedom is a necessary aspect of the rational actor by definition; without 
the freedom to follow rational decision-making strategies, the actor 
 
it is an “acknowledgement of God as the source of all goodness and therefore the One who can meet 
human need and longing.”  Id. at 763.  However, in Islam, prayer is much more formal or detached 
in style and is done five times a day in remembrance of God.  Id. 
 158. Id. at 631.  Meditation is defined as: 
A form of mental prayer.  In Christianity, the term has been used since 16th cent., in 
distinction from contemplation, as a discursive activity, which involves thinking about 
passages from scripture and mysteries of the faith with a view to deeper understanding 
and a loving response.  Many methods of meditation were taught, especially by the 
Jesuits.  Outside this historical context, the term meditation is used more widely, 
embracing contemplation; and in this wider sense, is applied to practices of many 
different kinds in virtually all religions. 
Id. 
 159. This may be the dynamic that has come to be known as “personalism”: 
[A]pplied primarily to the philosophy of the French thinker Emmanuel Mounier (1905-
50), [personalism is] a Christian version of existentialism stressing communion on the 
basis of shared values, with the person, as distinct from the political individual, as the 
locus of a “unique vocation” directed towards fellowship.  Other philosophers who have 
made personhood a fundamental concept include the German philosopher Rudolf 
Hermann Lotze (1817-81), the American idealists Josiah Royce (1855-1916) and Edgar 
Sheffield Brightman (1884-1953), and the Scottish humanist, John Macmurray (1891-
1976).  Common to these thinkers is the view that the finite individual is somehow 
grounded in and seeks its fulfillment in an infinite spirit, or God, understood as personal, 
though Macmurray opposed idealism and considered “God” mainly a negative concept 
given positive content only in actual relations among persons. 
THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 692 (Ted Honderich ed., 2d ed. 2005). 
 160. See John H. Aldrich, Rational Choice and Turnout, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 246, 247 (1993) 
(discussing the rational choice theory and how a person’s preferences determine their political 
behavior); Thomas Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 
882-84 (1963) (stating that the inherent right of all members in society to freely form their own 
opinions and beliefs through open discussion is an indispensable piece of a democratically 
organized society). 
 161. See Aldrich, supra note 160, at 247-48 (outlining the choices rational political actors will 
make based on their preferences for outcomes with higher individual utility).  See generally D.M. 
ARMSTRONG, A MATERIALIST THEORY OF THE MIND 158 (Routledge 1993) (1968); Roger W. 
Sperry, Changing Concepts of Consciousness and Free Will, 20 PERSPECTIVES IN BIO. & MED. 9, 
14-15 (1976); Roger W. Sperry, Mind, Brain, and Humanist Values, 22 BULLETIN ATOMIC 
SCIENTISTS 2-6 (1966) (proposing that subjective experience plays a very significant role in brain 
function). 
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cannot make the kind of presumptively valid and predictable decision we 
need from her.162  Cognitive freedom is also necessary to effective 
public governance because that effectiveness is influenced by the 
expression of well informed social and political conscience,163 and 
conscience itself presupposes a right to defy orthodoxy in belief.164  It 
occurred to me that a useful metaphor for the solitary and unfettered 
nature of political thought is embodied in the polling station itself.  The 
curtained black box into which we insert our physical bodies in order to 
cast our votes is an instantiation of the zone of exclusion sheltering our 
political ideas, and while we ultimately mark our votes on a ballot, our 
votes are cast in our heads first. 
These three different contexts for tracking human social 
conventions and behaviors—philosophy and psychology, religion and 
theology, and liberal political theory—were selected for this survey 
because they are representative of the shared social consensus that exists 
on matters of cognitive freedom or liberty.  The inherent solitude of the 
human mind is the foundation for our understanding of how we relate as 
individuals to the external world.165  The premise that we can and should 
exclude all others from the sphere of our inner cognitive environment is 
central to the manner in which each person formulates a sense of self, 
and provides a framework or point of reference for navigating a given 
social context.166  Both the institutions of religion and individual 
experiences of the divine proceed from the understanding that what 
appears before me in my inner visions is as true and authentic as any 
consciousness that could be shared by the wider community, and the 
solitary nature of revelation may be essential to the generation of faith in 
general.  Governance of political communities requires the expression of 
informed judgment by independent, rational decision-makers who are 
free to hold whatever opinions they might.167  Each aspect of thinking 
 
 162. See Aldrich, supra note 160, at 247-51 (defining the basic model of voting and explaining 
the motive and predictability of rational decision-making).  See generally Halliburton, supra note 3. 
 163. See Aldrich, supra note 160, at 248 (explaining that there are costs of voting, including 
the cost of finding and processing information, as well as deciding how to vote with that 
information).  See generally Halliburton, supra note 3. 
 164. Id. at 339 (“The validity of these decision-making moments depends on there being a 
genuine choice presented to the decision-maker, or else the rational calculation is short-circuited.”).  
See generally Aldrich, supra note 160. 
 165. See Halliburton, supra note 3, at 339-40 (summarizing three areas of our self that define 
us both internally and externally which CCTs could threaten: the nature of our subject self, nature of 
our spiritual identity, and our political beliefs). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Emerson, supra note 160, at 882-84. 
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about the human animal, as both a solitary and socialized creature, 
depends on the theoretical and actual treatment of the human mind as an 
absolute zone of exclusion. 
The problem with privacy-based Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 
at least in this regard, is that it fails to adequately police and preserve 
this most important zone of exclusion in a way that defies the social 
command that the mind be free.  There are three very basic methods the 
existing privacy approach might offer to determine whether the 
government may permissibly employ CCTs or engage in cognitive 
surveillance.168  The first and most conventional approach would be to 
determine whether there was probable cause for the intrusion, and either 
a warrant or a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.169  It 
appears that there very often may be probable cause to believe that a 
cognitive examination will uncover important evidence of crime, and it 
is as easy to imagine a magistrate approving a warrant on that basis as it 
is to concoct hypothetical circumstances presenting sufficient exigency 
to forego a warrant.  But neither of these analyses are structured to 
consider the impact on the individual’s cognitive freedom, so the 
traditional approach would obscure rather than resolve the concerns 
raised by CCTs. 
The second approach would simply ask whether the cognitive 
surveillance activity appears reasonable, balancing the government’s 
need to conduct the intrusion against the depth of that intrusion upon the 
individual’s interest in being let alone.170  While this model might 
 
 168. Halliburton, supra note 3, at 340-43, 350-51. 
 169. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15-17 (1948).  With this decision, Justice 
Jackson gave concrete form to a previously amorphous “warrant preference,” and established a 
standard under which all warrantless intrusions (that is, either a “search” or “seizure” as those terms 
of art are defined) are presumptively illegal.  Id.  There are numerous examples of the Court 
invaliding a law enforcement search for failure to secure a warrant.  See, e.g., Steagald v. United 
States, 451 U.S. 204, 213 (1981); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477-79 (1971); Katz 
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13-14.  The Court has also 
discussed the “warrant preference” in the context of doctrinal exceptions to application of the 
preference.  See, e.g., Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116 (1998) (discussing the two historical 
reasons for allowing a search incident to arrest: the need to disarm a suspect and the need to 
preserve evidence for use at trial); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 379 (1993) (applying the 
Terry exception to the facts and deciding that the doctrine cannot apply because the incriminating 
character of the contraband was not immediately clear); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987) 
(holding that the plain view doctrine does not extend to the seizure of stolen stereo equipment found 
while executing a search for other evidence); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 394 (1985) 
(declining to distinguish between “worthy” and “unworthy” vehicles for purposes of the vehicle 
exception). 
 170. E.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); see Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 
646, 656 (1995) (upholding warrantless and suspicionless searches of high school students on the 
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suggest an avenue for at least considering the harm caused by CCTs, the 
reasonableness approach is nevertheless centered on privacy and, as 
detailed later in this Article, privacy as a construct is too porous or too 
malleable to ensure consistent treatment of, and protection from, 
CCTs.171 
The final strand of the Fourth Amendment that might be used to 
measure the validity of cognitive surveillance is the “sense enhancing 
technology” doctrine from Kyllo v. United States.172  According to this 
doctrine, we have a legitimate expectation of privacy that protects us (at 
least in the home) against intrusions affected by technology not 
generally available for public use.173  This would also appear to offer 
some check against cognitive surveillance, for certainly the sophisticated 
machinery needed to engage in such surveillance is not widely available 
or accessible to the average member of the community.174  But that is 
little consolation in light of the nature of CCTs and their potential.  It is 
not difficult to imagine private, non-law enforcement incentives to use 
CCTs in the areas of employment, health care, and transportation,175 and 
if CCTs become prevalent in these private contexts, then that social 
reality would undermine or neutralize the limitation imposed by Kyllo.176  
 
grounds that state’s interest in educational order outweighs students’ diminished interests in 
personal privacy and autonomy); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 544 (1985) 
(concluding that monitoring bowel movement of detained border crossers based upon agents’ 
suspicion of alimentary canal smuggling need only be, and was, reasonable); United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562 (1976) (explaining that brief interrogative stops of all motorists 
crossing certain border checkpoints are reasonable even without individualized suspicion because of 
sovereign interest in controlling entry). 
 171. Supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 172. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that use of sense-enhancing 
technology to gather any information regarding interior of home that could not otherwise have been 
obtained without physical intrusion into constitutionally protected area constitutes a “search” within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). 
 173. Id. at 34-35. 
 174. See Paul Root Wolpe, Kenneth R. Foster & Daniel D. Langleben, Emerging 
Neurotechnologies for Lie-Detection: Promises and Perils, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 
39, 39-40 (acknowledging that while most brain-imaging technologies are still in the research stage, 
the possibility of wider public use is a concern that must be addressed). 
 175. “For example, private firms employing CCT technology may come to offer ‘deception 
detection’ to banks looking for honest employees, to schools looking to weed out potential child 
molesters, or to security companies seeking to identify those that might have a propensity for 
corruption.”  Halliburton, supra note 3, at 330 n.9; see Wolpe et al., supra note 174, at 45-46 
(discussing the current need for highly trained professionals to read the data which CCT technology 
produces, while analyzing the possible uses if the technology were developed enough to be used by 
the general public). 
 176. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (“[W]here (as here) the technology in question is not in general 
public use . . . [t]his assures preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed 
when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”).  Inevitably, technology will advance, and if CCT 
34
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The consequence is that, even respecting the Kyllo opinion, the Fourth 
Amendment could eventually be reconciled with warrantless, 
suspicionless application of CCTs without the Court ever having to 
decide whether the harm imposed by that cognitive intrusion has 
diminished.  The Kyllo doctrine permits liberty to vary with the level of 
technological sophistication possessed by the larger society,177 but 
cognitive liberty and mental solitude have meanings and values that do 
not similarly fluctuate. 
These three strikes by the privacy-driven Fourth Amendment—
representing failed efforts to capture the whole of liberty—ignore the 
premise offered by the surveyed fields that our thoughts are our own, 
and the contents of the mind are off-limits to uninvited interlopers.  This 
premise offers a depiction of the society, of the human reality, that the 
law generally and the Fourth Amendment specifically must serve, for 
cognitive freedom is necessary to being a person and it is the rights of 
persons that our Bill of Rights variously guarantees.178  In short, the 
Fourth Amendment is fatally out of step with the society it governs, if it 
does not respect the centrality of cognitive freedom and mental solitude 
in defining who we are as persons and as a nation. 
Moreover, our failure to conceive of the Fourth Amendment in a 
way that reflects and corresponds to the centrality of cognitive liberty 
produces unnecessary and counterproductive tensions within the 
Constitution itself.  In the face of the inevitable interpretive moment, 
when the meaning of a constitutional provision or aspect of the Bill of 
Rights is less clear than is the legal system’s need for an answer, one of 
the most reliable methods for resolving the ambiguity is to do so in a 
way that advances or at least is in harmony with other substantive 
provisions of the charter.179  Much like the approach of the 
 
technology becomes as common as cellular phones or the Internet (once used exclusively by the 
United States military), then Kyllo will no longer serve as protection. 
 177. See id. (holding that the issue turns on whether the general public has access to the 
technology). 
 178. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905) (noting that there is a zone within 
which an individual can assert his own free will and contest the authority of the people’s 
government). 
 179. Compare James J. Brudney, Recalibrating Federal Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 149, 175 (2003) (“[T]extualism focuses almost exclusively on the words Congress has enacted, 
relying on ordinary usage, dictionary definitions, canons of construction, and harmonization with 
similar language in other laws or in other provisions of the same statute.”), and Caleb Nelson, What 
is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 352 (2005) (“[I]nterpretation should focus ‘upon what the text 
would reasonably be understood to mean, rather than upon what it was intended to mean.’” (quoting 
Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal 
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
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intratextualist, what I have called organism-perpetuating constitutional 
consistency (OPCC) seeks to infuse any ambiguous provisions with 
meaning informed by a sense of the overall health of, and vital 
coordination between, the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.180  This 
mode of interpretation recognizes that liberty is a complex creature, and 
that it can be maintained only by the operation of specialized, but 
mutually reinforcing constitutional provisions.181  Reusing a very simple 
example, OPCC would encourage interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment’s existing privacy provisions in a way that maximizes First 
Amendment freedoms, or construes First Amendment protections in a 
way that advances Fourth Amendment-style privacy (at least so long as 
privacy remains the Fourth Amendment’s accepted normative focus).  At 
the very least, OPCC eschews interpretive outcomes that produce 
intratextual antagonism or analytical hostility between and within 
constitutional sections. 
Within the rubric of OPCC, a Fourth Amendment founded on 
privacy does not fare well.  Again using the porosity of privacy in the 
face of CCTs as a data point, and incorporating the suggestion that 
cognitive liberty is at the core of human identity and freedom, privacy 
approaches to regulating police behavior prove counterproductive or 
even incompatible with other well established and important 
constitutional freedoms.  Most obviously, CCTs violate the most basic 
of Fifth182 and Fourteenth Amendment183 liberty interests, the right to 
 
COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 129, 144 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997))), with Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic 
Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and Our Bifurcated Constitution, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1259, 1281 
(2001) (defining holism as “an approach that seeks to take into account the basic structure and 
values of the Constitution in the interpretation of all of its provisions”). 
 180. The OPCC approach can be summarized as follows: 
Organism-perpetuating constitutional models would therefore seek to preserve and 
promote that vitality, and eschew the introduction of any disease or defect that is 
destructive to the body.  Biological health tends to maximize survival, and survival is the 
strongest genetic incentive, so we should likewise understand the Constitution to 
promote action in accordance with its best health prospects and to ensure its own 
survival.   
Organism-perpetuating models thus reject the utility if not the very validity of construing 
constitutional provisions as operating in tension with one another.  Just as biological 
health is impaired when collaborative systems become antagonistic to each other, so too 
is the health of the Constitution impaired when coexisting coordinate legal provisions are 
applied in an antagonistic fashion.  In concrete terms, organism-perpetuating models 
prevent an interpretation of the Constitution that causes one process (i.e. provision) of 
the organism (i.e. the Constitution) to impair the full and optimal functioning of another. 
Halliburton, supra note 3, at 366-67. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”). 
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simply be left alone,184 and they violate that right in the most egregious 
fashion, by opening up your mind, your most personal of spaces, to 
official scrutiny.  Non-consensual use of CCTs is also destructive of the 
rights of conscience, belief, and expressive activity enshrined in the First 
Amendment185 because freedom to enjoy any of those rights requires the 
right to think freely a priori.186  Finally, resorting to privacy for Fourth 
Amendment purposes defeats the many aspects of the Constitution that 
guarantee the individual’s right to vote187 and exert her political will 
through the democratic process.188  While these are just some of the 
ways in which resolving Fourth Amendment debates by reference to 
privacy is inefficient, they are sufficient for anyone concerned with the 
Constitution’s (and the nation’s) long-term vitality to reconsider this 
prevailing approach.  Applying the guidelines of OPCC to this scenario 
does two things: it provides an explicit basis for rejecting the 
conventional but unhealthy beliefs about the Fourth Amendment’s true 
purpose, and it provides clues in the search for superior alternatives.  In 
this present situation, OPCC unquestionably suggests that a new and 
 
 183. The Fourteenth Amendment states: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the law. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 184. The Supreme Court has described this right as follows: 
The protection guaranteed by the [Fourth and Fifth] Amendments is . . . broad[] in scope.  
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of 
happiness.  They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings 
and of his intellect.  They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of 
life are to be found in material things.  They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, 
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.  They conferred, as against the 
Government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right 
most valued by civilized men.  To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the 
Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be 
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 185. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, 
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.”). 
 186. See Halliburton, supra note 3, at 310 (positing an interdisciplinary “consensus” around the 
proposition that cognitive confidentiality and unfettered thought are essential “in the 
conceptualization of an open human society”). 
 187. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall 
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State . . . .”). 
 188. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this 
Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion . . . .”). 
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improved Fourth Amendment norm is one that maximizes the freedoms 
specifically addressed by other liberty provisions of the Constitution. 
It is important to comprehend the urgency of this search.  Brain 
Fingerprinting and similar CCTs pose a threat to human freedom and 
cognitive liberty that is both real and severe enough to justly provoke a 
response from the legal academy and from the judicial system, and they 
present a challenge to the Fourth Amendment’s ability to preserve our 
cognitive landscape as a zone of exclusion that it is incapable of meeting 
in its current form.  Yet Brain Fingerprinting is already in some ways 
yesterday’s news, and new frontiers in CCT are rapidly opening.189  
CCTs are being developed that go beyond mere lie detection and 
knowledge assessment and allow operators to predict future intentions 
and choice probabilities,190 and to make determinations about a person’s 
moral character and judgment,191 all based on what happens inside the 
mind.  Each of these new capacities employs cerebral monitoring 
technologies that can gather the relevant data without the consent or 
even active participation of the subject.192 
As fascinating as these new devices and processes are, and as much 
promise as they hold for many areas of human development, their only 
relevance here is as heralds of the arrival of the era of cognitive 
surveillance.193  As cognitive and diagnostic sciences continue to 
advance, there will be more and more ways to peer into an individual’s 
mind, and history shows that CCTs (as with all scientific techniques) 
 
 189. See Wolpe et al., supra note 174, at 41 (concluding that the technology is not actually 
new, pointing to a report of similar studies as far back as 1988, and asserting that the technology is 
already being marketed for forensic, medical, advertising, and security purposes). 
 190. According to one news report: 
In the past, scientists had been able to detect decisions about making physical 
movements before those movements appeared.  But researchers at Berlin’s Bernstein 
Center for Computational Neuroscience claim they have now, for the first time, 
identified people’s decisions about how they would later do a high-level mental 
activity—in this case, adding versus subtracting. 
Maria Cheng, Scientists Try to Predict Intentions, CBS NEWS ONLINE, Mar. 5, 2007, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/03/05/ap/tech/mainD8NM0O8G0.shtml. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See Wolpe et al., supra note 174, at 46 (adding that brain scans could reveal data about us, 
including personality traits, mental illness, sexual preferences, or predisposition to drug addiction). 
 193. See generally Kirstie Ball, Elements of Surveillance: A New Framework and Future 
Directions, 5 INFO. COMMC’N & SOC’Y 573, 573-90 (2002); John Pienaar, Olympics Audio 
Surveillance Row, BBC NEWS ONLINE, Nov. 26, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/ 
6186348.stm (reporting how a new civil liberties controversy flared up over the news that police 
chiefs were considering using high-powered microphones to “eavesdrop”); Nick Taylor, State 
Surveillance and the Right to Privacy, 1 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 66, 66-85 (2002), available at 
http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/articles1/statesurv.pdf (describing the new technological 
advancements that allow increased privacy intrusions). 
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will do so with increasing resolution and accuracy.194  Brain 
Fingerprinting-type CCTs were enough to raise a whole host of potential 
harms to cognitive autonomy, and to expose a fatal flaw in the Fourth 
Amendment.  These new and emerging species of CCT only make 
matters worse.  They extend the temporal span of available information 
from what you know or what you might have done to embrace 
predictions of what you may do in the future.195  These forward-looking 
CCTs also expand the range of culpability determinations that can be 
made from whether one is lying to whether one is morally inclined to be 
a liar in general.196  With each of these expansions in the type of 
cognitive surveillance comes a proportional exacerbation of the toll 
CCTs can take on our cognitive and constitutional liberty interests.  The 
very express point of this discussion is to sound the alarm now, while 
the law can still lead the way, and before CCTs become so widespread 
that our Constitution is forced to adapt to, rather than resist, their 
application. 
B.  The Critiques of Katz 
The preceding section described the deep sense of dread that I felt 
when I considered the implications that an era of cognitive surveillance 
carried, and my critique of the Fourth Amendment as a privacy-fueled 
failure when cognitive liberty is at stake.  My point there was to suggest 
that cognitive liberty is essential to at least this human society, if not to 
all, and that the Fourth Amendment’s failure to preserve that liberty 
produces serious and untenable consequences that are directly 
attributable to its privacy norm.  This section incorporates several 
additional critiques of the Fourth Amendment’s privacy fetish that do 
not depend so centrally on cognitive liberty, but which nonetheless add 
fuel to the pyre on which I hope to immolate the current Fourth 
Amendment.197  Perhaps, in its ashes, we will see the birth of a new 
Fourth Amendment norm that can carry this country into and through the 
cognitive surveillance era.  This section aims to turn up the heat. 
 
 194. Henryk Skolimowski, The Structure of Thinking in Technology, 7 TECH. & CULTURE 301, 
375 (1966) (“The growth of technology manifests itself precisely through its ability to produce more 
and more diversified objects with more and more interesting features, in a more and more efficient 
way.”). 
 195. See Wolpe et al., supra note 174, at 46 (noting that the scans could locate predisposition 
to certain types of behavior, even if they have yet to manifest). 
 196. Id. 
 197. See discussion infra Part II.B.1 (describing the inadequacies of the protections under the 
Fourth Amendment). 
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1.  Privacy Flaws in the Legal Definition of a “Search” 
One need not probe too deeply into the academic literature to find 
doctrinal critiques of the Court’s privacy-based Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, but there are several important or innovative perspectives 
worth mentioning here.  Professor Sherry Colb has laid out one strategy 
for addressing “the instability and poverty of Fourth Amendment 
doctrine”198 by highlighting two aspects of the Court’s privacy 
framework that have “steadily eroded privacy in specific cases, and 
conceptually promise to eliminate it altogether.”199  Recognizing that the 
Court’s discomfort with the privacy norm it created stems in part from 
the evidentiary consequences of a judicial finding that reasonable 
expectations of privacy have been violated by state action,200 Professor 
Colb identifies two analytical “moves” that the Court will make in its 
privacy discussions that allow it to avoid suppressing evidence, but 
which also lead it to construe privacy unduly narrowly.201 
In its first move, the Court uses the “knowing exposure” component 
of its privacy framework to equate risk of exposure to third parties as 
intentional invitation for that exposure.202  In essence, the Court may be 
seen as using a recklessness or even negligence standard in place of a 
true knowledge standard when it considers the consequences of an 
individual’s failure (or inability) to protect against disclosure vis-à-vis 
that person’s reasonable expectations of privacy.203  This means that 
individuals will be deemed to have surrendered their right to exclude 
others without being aware of that surrender or having such surrender as 
their conscious objective, and it “effectively excuses (and even justifies) 
what would otherwise be wrongful conduct by third parties, including 
the police.”204 
In what is described as the second move, the Court treats limited 
and circumscribed exposure to specific third parties as intentional 
exposure to the whole world.205  In this way, the Court may be seen as 
 
 198. Sherry F. Colb, What is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine 
and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV 119, 123 (2002). 
 199. Id. at 121. 
 200. Id. 
 201. See id. at 122 (acknowledging that both of these moves occur beneath the surface, causing 
the doctrine and the concept of privacy to be unstable). 
 202. Id. at 124. 
 203. See id. (contending that the behavior of an individual, if reasonably believed to be inviting 
others to look or listen, is, in effect, an invitation for the police to do the same). 
 204. Id. at 122. 
 205. As Colb explains, this practice: 
[t]reats the risk of exposure through third-party wrongdoing as tantamount to an 
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treating Fourth Amendment privacy much the way it does confidentiality 
for purposes of evidentiary privileges.206  Just as any exposure to third 
parties destroys the confidentiality underlying the attorney-client 
privilege,207 the Court treats Fourth Amendment privacy as an all-or-
nothing proposition,208 the protections of which are surrendered forever 
and entirely even if the intentional exposure is expressly limited in 
scope, duration, and audience.  The consequences of this analytical 
move, and the Court’s ambivalence about privacy as a legal value, 
results in a failure “to recognize degrees of privacy in the Fourth 
Amendment context,”209 and provides a ready opportunity for 
transgression of societal norms by government actors en route.210  Before 
providing two possible remedies that could reduce the detrimental 
impact of using these two analytical moves,211 Professor Colb very 
precisely demonstrates that the Court’s approach to privacy under the 
Fourth Amendment is flawed at its core because privacy considerations 
have produced analytically and normatively suspect subsidiary doctrines. 
 
invitation for that exposure . . . . If a man lies down and falls into a deep sleep on a 
subway train, for example, he risks having his pocket picked.  A pickpocket can easily 
swipe the sleeping man’s wallet without encountering any resistance.  We might even 
say colloquially that the sleeping man has “asked to have his pocket picked.”  This 
colloquialism does not, however, describe a legal justification for the pickpocket.  We 
would not say, in other words, that the man on the train has willingly agreed to the taking 
of his wallet (as we would, for example, if he had abandoned the wallet in the street).  
Like taking candy from a baby, taking a wallet from a sleeping man remains a crime, no 
matter how easy it is to accomplish. 
Id. 
 206. See 2 KENNETH S. BROWN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 150-71 (6th ed. 2006) 
(discussing exceptions to the hearsay rule). 
 207. Id. 
 208. See Colb, supra note 198, at 122-24 (claiming that exposure to a few people is treated as 
exposure to the world); see also Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 
58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 395 (1974) (referring to the Fourth Amendment as a monolith and 
concluding that neither the history nor text of the Amendment is of any help in construing its 
meaning). 
 209. Colb, supra note 198, at 122. 
 210. Id. at 122-23. 
 211. Id. at 123 (arguing that the “notion of ‘knowing exposure’ ought to (and does, in its 
definition) resemble the idea of ‘consent’ to a search”).  Colb continues: 
Recognizing a common definition for these two concepts would yield beneficial results.  
First, it would represent an open acknowledgement that “knowing exposure” only occurs 
when there has been some explicit or tacit consent to public observation, and not simply 
the taking of a risk or the limited exposure of what is then further disseminated.  Second, 
the coordination of “knowing exposure” and “consent” might move the Court to 
reconsider its ill-advised position that one can give voluntary consent to a search without 
knowing that police would take “no” for an answer. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
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2.  Privacy and the Problem of Hiddenness 
Professor Daniel Yeager very persuasively argues that the 
problematic operation of the privacy construct in the context of criminal 
procedure regulations is a reflection of privacy’s sense of 
“hiddenness.”212  Privacy is conceived of as a veil of secrecy that 
prevents the development of factual knowledge or access to information 
by an outside observer about what a person thinks and knows, and about 
what they have done or will do.213  This notion of hiddenness is in 
tension with the jurisprudence of criminal procedure, which otherwise 
relies so fundamentally on levels of information or knowledge to justify 
police action.214  What the Fourth Amendment doctrines refer to as 
levels of suspicion, from “hunches” to specific and articulable facts, to 
probable cause and even proof beyond a reasonable doubt, are 
simultaneously measures of an individual’s success (or failure) at being 
hidden from the public, and also represent levels of justification 
recognized by the law as bases for overcoming an individual’s desire to 
remain hidden.215  The problem with privacy, then, is that its aspect of 
hiddenness—the ability of people to keep information and facts 
confidential—produces a systemic incentive to overcome that 
hiddenness most strongly where information is not otherwise available 
except from the hiding individual.216  Further, when grappling with the 
question of what level of informational or suspicious justification is 
sufficient to overcome expectations of privacy, the Court is essentially 
deciding what level of hiddenness merits legal recognition, but does not 
and cannot identify empirical bases for its line-drawing exercises.  
Professor Yeager demonstrates that property law provided the necessary 
empirical basis lacking in privacy prior to Katz,217 and that more general 
expressions of social values in positive law played that role for a time 
even after the Katz decision.218  He then correctly concludes that the 
Court has since lacked any objective criteria for determining when a 
 
 212. Daniel Yeager, Overcoming Hiddenness: The Role of Intentions in Fourth Amendment 
Analysis, 74 MISS. L.J. 553, 564-71 (2004). 
 213. See id. at 557-58 (arguing that privacy is a problem, because it provides a license to 
deceive, misunderstand, and make incorrect judgments). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 561-62. 
 216. See id. at 560 (noting that when someone is suspicious, others are less likely to ask them 
what is going on, even though that is often the best way to obtain information, and instead attempt 
to overcome their hiddenness through covertness or coercion). 
 217. Id. at 567-68. 
 218. See id. at 574-75 (quoting cases that hold that property law is not completely outside 
Fourth Amendment protection). 
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desire for hiddenness is a viable aspect of Fourth Amendment privacy 
and when such expectations must give way to superior public or law 
enforcement interests.219  After reading Professor Yeager’s article one 
might fairly claim that privacy’s scion—hiddenness—produces an 
informational imbalance and uncertainty regarding other people’s acts 
and intentions that make it impossible to distinguish “good,” justifiable 
privacy from “bad,” unjustifiable privacy.  This allows the Court to 
essentially make up the rules as it goes along.220 
3.  Privacy as Vigilance or Forbearance 
Professor William Heffernan joins this chorus by faulting the Court 
for paying nominal attention to privacy interests while giving nothing 
more than lip service to the mechanisms that protect those interests.221  
Heffernan suggests that the Court has been hypocritical in Fourth 
Amendment cases by feigning concern for residential and interpersonal 
privacy while allowing police practices wholly destructive of such 
privacy,222 and he attributes that sort of judicial double-dealing to a flaw 
in the very concept of privacy the Court employs.223  Modern Fourth 
Amendment doctrine, according to Heffernan, produces dysfunctional 
results that narrowly rather than broadly construe liberty or privacy 
interests because the Court employs “a vigilance model of privacy, one 
that requires people to be constantly alert to the way in which others can 
intrude on their lives.”224  However, Heffernan points out that the Court 
has always used the mores shared by the lay public (rather than police or 
institutional actors) as a measure of the right to privacy.225  The problem 
with privacy arises because these norms generally embraced by lay 
society “are grounded not in vigilance but in an expectation of 
forbearance on the part of others—that is, in an expectation that others 
will restrain their curiosity with respect to those aspects of life that are 
essential to defining and maintaining individual identity.”226  This 
 
 219. Id. at 575. 
 220. See id. at 560 (claiming that hiddenness precludes people from asking about suspicious 
actions, making it impossible to know whether their actions are legal or illegal). 
 221. See generally William Heffernan, Fourth Amendment Privacy Interests, 92 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2001-02). 
 222. Id. at 3. 
 223. Id. at 5-6. 
 224. Id. at 6. 
 225. Id. at 5.  This analytical reliance on public values largely explains Justice Harlan’s 
repeated references to objectively reasonable expectations as the touchstone of Fourth Amendment 
privacy. 
 226. Id. at 6. 
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misguided choice of the vigilance model over the forbearance model 
allows the Court to reflect generally on privacy expectations by 
reference to public values, which are in fact shaped by an expectation 
that people will leave one another alone, while fixing the level of 
privacy protection in specific cases by reference to law enforcement 
institutional values, which necessarily are shaped by the obligation and 
desire not to leave people alone or to obviate privacy to the greatest 
extent possible.227  This disconnect between the vigilance model and the 
forbearance model, and the occupational discounting of privacy by 
police actors which it allows, is constitutionally unacceptable. 
4.  Privacy and New Technologies 
Turning from these doctrinal and analytical inquiries to more 
pragmatic concerns, a legal understanding of emerging technologies 
other than CCTs is also showing privacy’s futility in regulating the 
current hi-tech social context.  Scholars working in this area have argued 
that the modern spate of technological innovation presents challenges to 
which privacy is ill-equipped to respond.228  For example, DNA 
collection and use of DNA evidence in criminal prosecutions is an 
investigative technique unknown to either the founders or to the Katz 
Court when it was writing privacy into the Fourth Amendment for the 
first time.229  Because this forensic technique is not going away, “[i]t is 
clear that if the judiciary is to maintain control over the expansion of 
DNA profiling, then non-intrusive DNA collection must be 
 
 227. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (pointing out that police officers, 
and law enforcement more generally are engaged in the “often competitive enterprise of ferreting 
out crime”). 
 228. See, e.g., Derek T. Conom, Comment, Sense-Enhancing Technology and the Search in the 
Wake of Kyllo v. United States: Will Prevalence Kill Privacy?, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 749, 751 
(2005) (showing that the general public use standard, though it purports to adhere to the public 
officer/private individual search rules the Court has used in the past, is not well-suited to handle 
modern issues of law and privacy such as those presented by technology like thermal imaging and 
image-enhancing devices); Rickey G. Glover, A Probable Nightmare: Lifting the Fog From the 
Cellular Surveillance Statutory Catastrophe, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1543, 1544-45 (2007) (arguing 
that, rather than elucidating the requisite showing required for law enforcement to obtain protected 
information, the resulting jurisprudence has merely confused what was an already complex area of 
technology law); Steven V. Treglia, Trailing Cell Phones: Courts Grapple with Requests from 
Prosecutors Seeking Prospective Tracking, N.Y. L.J., July 18, 2006, at 5 (discussing the district 
split, the minority position requiring a showing of specific and articulable facts, and the majority 
position requiring a showing of probable cause). 
 229. See Cynthia E. Jones, Evidence Destroyed, Innocence Lost: The Preservation of 
Biological Evidence Under Innocence Protection Statutes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1239, 1239 (2005) 
(noting that DNA technology was not yet available in a 1985 murder trial; the Katz case was before 
the U.S. Supreme Court in 1967). 
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accommodated” by Fourth Amendment doctrine.230  However, the kinds 
of “lasting limitations on the collection, use, and storage of DNA 
profiles and samples” that the Constitution should produce are not 
forthcoming under a privacy analysis.231  This is because two subsidiary 
strands of Fourth Amendment analysis, the knowing exposure doctrine, 
and judicial assessments of the degree of physical intrusiveness entailed 
in a search, are structured in a way that does not contend with the 
complexities and sophistication of DNA collection and profiling 
methods.232  “The Supreme Court’s current constitutional doctrines 
defining what constitutes a search requiring Fourth Amendment 
protection do not contemplate the ability to collect sensitive genetic 
information without any intrusion into an individual’s bodily integrity or 
offense to personal dignity.”233 
Professor Orin Kerr, one of the foremost scholars in the law and 
technology area, has similarly identified “a critical gap between privacy 
rules the modern Fourth Amendment provides and privacy rules needed 
to effectively regulate government use of developing technologies.”234  
Professor Kerr argues that courts should tread lightly when using the 
Constitution to scrutinize new technologies, and should defer in favor of 
legislative responses.235  One basis of this argument is his belief that the 
privacy norm in Katz has done little to move the Fourth Amendment 
beyond the limitations of its archaic property-based jurisprudence.236  
Another is that the salient legal challenges that new technologies pose 
neither implicate property rights with sufficient regularity, nor can these 
challenges be resolved by resort to a generalized right to privacy in the 
face of developing technologies.237  Again, while Kerr’s thesis is that 
courts are not institutionally well-situated to make the necessary 
regulatory decisions regarding new technology, this is so at least in part 
because of the shortcomings of privacy as a motivating constitutional 
concept.238 
 
 230. Justin A. Alfano, Note, Look What Katz Leaves Out: Why DNA Collection Challenges the 
Scope of the Fourth Amendment, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1017, 1042 (2005). 
 231. Id. at 1046. 
 232. Id. at 1019. 
 233. Id. at 1046. 
 234. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and 
the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 807 (2004). 
 235. Id. at 805-06. 
 236. Id. at 815-16. 
 237. Id. at 809. 
 238. Id. at 806. 
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5.  Norm-Level Assaults on Privacy 
In addition to the pointed attacks on the doctrines that the privacy 
norm has produced, there have been numerous efforts (of which this 
Article is one) to reorient the Fourth Amendment toward, or altogether 
displace privacy in favor of, other socio-legal values.239  Professor 
Morgan Cloud’s 1996 article, The Fourth Amendment During the 
Lochner Era:  Privacy, Property and Liberty in Constitutional Theory240 
attacks Katz’s privacy principle by suggesting that the only clear or 
coherent theory of the Fourth Amendment was that utilized during the 
“Lochner Era” (1897-1937).241  Cloud seeks to replicate the rigor of that 
theory by proposing a fusion of three influences:  (1) Fourth Amendment 
pragmatism, along the lines advocated by Justice Brandeis; (2) legal 
formalism; and (3) the warrant model.242  These three jurisprudential 
influences would coordinate to restore the formal legal recognition of the 
relationship among property, privacy, and liberty, and thus would blend 
the primary influences driving the Fourth Amendment in its pre-Katz 
era.243 
In this same vein, Professor Heffernan has argued that property and 
privacy go hand-in-hand, and that they can play simultaneous and 
mutually reinforcing roles in Fourth Amendment analysis.244  Based 
largely on the Supreme Court’s decision in Soldal v. Cook County,245 
Heffernan’s understanding of the Fourth Amendment is not one which 
privileges privacy to the exclusion of all else, but rather one that creates 
two “independently actionable interests—a privacy interest that is 
protected in the absence of interference with a property interest (as in a 
wiretapping case) and a property interest that is protected in the absence 
of an interference with a privacy interest (as in a government-aided 
eviction).”246 
Going beyond such hybridization models, which accept privacy as 
one of a matrix of complimentary legal norms, Professor Raymond Ku 
 
 239. See, e.g., Halliburton, supra note 3; Heffernan, supra note 221 (submitting alternative 
theories upon which Fourth Amendment privacy and personal security can be based). 
 240. Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, and 
Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555 (1996). 
 241. Id. at 556. 
 242. Id. at 561. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Heffernan, supra note 221. 
 245. 506 U.S. 56 (1992). 
 246. William C. Heffernan, Property, Privacy, and the Fourth Amendment, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 
633, 636 (1994) (emphasis added). 
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has argued the now radical proposition that the Fourth Amendment is 
about power, not about privacy.247  Professor Ku contends that “the 
[Fourth] [A]mendment is best understood as a means of preserving the 
people’s authority over government—the people’s sovereign right to 
determine how and when the government may intrude into the lives and 
influence the behavior of its citizens.”248  While privacy certainly may 
be infringed when the government disregards the Constitution, it is not a 
concern for privacy, but instead a “[f]ear of government power and 
discretion . . . [that] runs through even the most privacy-centric 
decision.”249  “The [A]mendment affords [its] protection not by defining 
what is private, but by expressly limiting government’s power to 
conduct searches.”250  The net effect of this, according to Ku, is that the 
law is able to assure “preservation of that degree of privacy against 
government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”251  
Ku’s proposal is both well-reasoned and incredibly promising.  It self-
consciously presents a “macro level”252 perspective that may be in 
harmony with the aspirations of the founders and the Fourth 
Amendment.  However, this model does not sufficiently operationalize 
the Fourth Amendment as a tool for “micro level” decisions. 
Though a good number of other valid ways of problematizing the 
privacy theory of the Fourth Amendment exist,253 the examples 
presented here are representative of a rich constellation of doctrinal 
strategies and theoretical alternatives.  These strategies and theories 
interact, in a sense, insofar as many of the theoretical alternatives are 
shaped and justified by one or more doctrinal weaknesses in the privacy 
rubric.  The purpose of their placement here is to suggest that, even 
though the Court may have made up its mind, the best mode and method 
for Fourth Amendment interpretation may have yet to be identified. 
 
 247. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founder’s Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the Power of 
Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1326 (2002). 
 248. Id. at 1326. 
 249. Id. at 1337. 
 250. Id. at 1338. 
 251. Id. at 1364 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)). 
 252. Id. at 1361. 
 253. See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, A Liberal House Divided: How the Warren Court Dismantled 
the Fourth Amendment, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 33, 46 (2005) (discussing the civil libertarian 
perspective, most notably attributed to Justice Douglas, which construed the Fourth Amendment 
expansively to restrict government intrusions into people’s lives); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Generalities of 
the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 49 (1974) (stating that “[t]he absence of a 
continuously developing rationalization of the amendment has enabled the Court to change 
direction, even to veer rapidly and sharply, without too obvious inconsistency; but the result is a 
body of doctrine that is unstable and unconvincing”). 
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IV.  RESTORING FOURTH AMENDMENT VITALITY WITH AN INFUSION OF 
THE PROPERTY OF PERSONHOOD 
Thus far, the aims of this Article have been threefold.  First, it 
meant to frame the discussion about Katz’s privacy principle with an 
appreciation of its historical place in Fourth Amendment doctrine.  
Second, it sought to expose the weaknesses within that privacy-based 
doctrine that become apparent when the Fourth Amendment is called 
upon to defend certain core social and constitutional values.  Third, it 
advanced the proposition that there are competing and perhaps superior 
normative perspectives that could drive Fourth Amendment 
interpretation and decision-making. 
In fact, I now make the corollary assertion that present law in this 
area is badly in need of reform.  Several possible kinds of approaches to 
reform have been briefly sketched, from calls to be more pragmatic or 
sensitive to other social norms in construing the privacy principle, to 
suggestions for augmenting privacy, or replacing it whole cloth.254 
I find myself agreeing with these jabs at Fourth Amendment 
privacy and its subsidiary doctrines or standards, individually and 
collectively.  Yet I do not find any one wholly satisfactory to the present 
challenge.  What I seek is greater clarity in the modes of analysis that 
courts will employ in Fourth Amendment (or any) cases, and a theory of 
the Fourth Amendment that does the intention and spirit of the framers’ 
justice.  But I also seek a theory that is not operating purely on the level 
of abstraction, so that it actually has utility in the real world.  My sense 
is that the Fourth Amendment has become far too complicated to do the 
job of guaranteeing the right of the people to be free in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, and that this complication is totally 
unnecessary.  I’m sure that this is not what she had in mind, but in what 
might have been a grand-maternal allusion to the logic rule known as 
Occam’s Razor,255 my Grandmother has repeatedly told me that when 
 
 254. See supra Parts II.B.2, II.B.4 (arguing that some of the problems with the privacy 
jurisprudence are its emphasis on “hiddenness” and its inability to adequately address concerns 
related to technological advancement). 
255. [A]ttributed to the 14th century English logician and Franciscan friar William of 
Ockham.  The principle states that the explanation of any phenomenon should make as 
few assumptions as possible, eliminating those that make no difference in the observable 
predictions of the explanatory hypothesis or theory.  The principle is often expressed in 
Latin as the lex parsimoniae[:] “entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity.”  
[This is often paraphrased as “All other things being equal, the simplest solution is the 
best.”]. 
Wikipedia, Occam’s Razor, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam’s_Razor (last visited Apr. 1, 2009). 
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things seem to be getting more complicated than necessary, they 
probably are, and that the best way to clearly see a way forward is to 
take a step back. 
That is what I now seek to do with this Article:  to take a step back 
from the obsession with (and fight over) privacy, and to think anew 
about the Fourth Amendment from the ground up.  I propose to go back 
to square one, to re-center the Fourth Amendment on notions of 
property, and then to adapt that traditional focus to the modern era.  In 
short, I want the Fourth Amendment to return to its roots in respect for 
property, and to simultaneously push the concept of property to embrace 
a wider range of human interests. 
Here is where Professor Radin’s notion of property and personhood 
promises such illumination.256  When initially struggling with the future 
of CCTs, and the incursion they can make into human consciousness, I 
kept circling back to a problem that did not involve privacy so much as 
ownership, dominion, and exclusion.  My instincts told me that I own 
my mind as much as I own my brain, and that I own my thoughts as 
much as the skull that houses them.  A conception of property as being 
essential to personhood grounds that intuition in a theoretical and 
normative reality. 
The final part of this Article lays out the relationship that may be 
forged between a personhood model of property and the liberty interests 
secured by the Fourth Amendment.  The argument in favor of such a 
relationship begins by describing the content and contours of Radin’s 
personhood model of property, and the personal property model of the 
Fourth Amendment that would result from this synthesis.  The 
discussion then returns to the problem of CCTs in order to map the 
application thereto of a proposed Fourth Amendment framework that 
relies on the property for personhood theory as its core value.  This 
section also identifies specific doctrinal differences that could be 
expected between a privacy-based and a personhood property-based 
Fourth Amendment, and ends with the assertion that returning to (or 
perhaps advancing towards) a robust property norm in Fourth 
Amendment criminal procedure is the most theoretically consistent and 
constitutionally authentic approach available.257 
 
 256. See generally Radin, supra note 50 (exploring the relationship between property interests 
and an individual’s need to control certain external resources to become a fully developed person). 
 257. See infra Part III.1.A-III.2.A.c. 
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A.  Radin’s Property and Personhood 
Professor Radin’s insightful exploration of the relationship between 
the law of property and what she calls the “personhood perspective”258 
led her to the conclusion that “the personhood perspective is often 
implicit in the connections that courts and commentators find between 
property and privacy or between property and liberty.”259  The core 
“premise underlying the personhood perspective is that to achieve proper 
self development—to be a person—an individual needs some control 
over resources in the external environment.”260  This personhood view of 
property embraces the reality that “[m]ost people possess certain objects 
they feel are almost part of themselves,”261 and that these things “are 
closely bound up with personhood because they are part of the way we 
constitute ourselves as continuing personal entities in the world.”262  
“Personal Property”—that property which is bound up with, or 
necessary, to becoming a full person and cannot be readily replaced or 
substituted,263—is distinguishable from “fungible property”—“that 
[which] is held purely instrumentally” and is “perfectly replaceable with 
other goods of equal market value.”264 
Radin seeks to contrast the “so-called personality theory of 
property” against both traditional libertarian, autonomy-centered notions 
of property and communitarian, public welfare-maximization models of 
property.265  While the personality theory of property may already play 
an implicit role in shaping conceptions of property,266 she suggests that 
the personality theory can provide both a general justification of 
property rights and a means of their specific delineation.267  Although 
she concedes that the former is beyond the scope of her article, she does 
undertake to demonstrate the latter.268 
Radin’s effort to provide content to her theory of property requires 
the ability to resolve competing property claims, and thus a method for 
 
 258. See generally, Radin, supra note 50 (positing that the personality theory of property may 
be able to resolve disputes between two individual claimants to the same object of personal 
property). 
 259. Id. at 957. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at 959. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 959-60. 
 265. Id. at 958. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. at 1008. 
50
Akron Law Review, Vol. 42 [2009], Iss. 3, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol42/iss3/6
11-HALLIBURTON_COPYFORPRINTER_FINAL.DOC 4/27/2009  12:44 PM 
2009] HOW PRIVACY KILLED KATZ 853 
distinguishing “good” property interests from “bad” property interests.269  
She uses these moral labels self-consciously, for she means to suggest 
that “good” property interests are those that reflect a positive social 
consensus on the value of those interests, and “bad” property claims are 
those that are socially unacceptable, or at least those less favored.270  
This good versus bad dichotomy allows Radin a measure for 
determining which of multiple competing property claims is superior.271  
However, before we can comfortably use her model for decision-making 
in specific contexts, a theoretical perspective on both the concept of the 
person and the concept of property must be developed. 
1.  Radin’s Model Person 
Of course, Radin must ground her personality theory of property in 
a definition of the person that supports the extensions she subsequently 
makes.  Her survey of available philosophical answers to the question of 
personhood reveals no overarching consensus,272 but she does find the 
prevailing approaches to fall into one of two broad categories: (1) the 
individualist approach and (2) the communitarian approach.273  Among 
the individual-centered concepts of the person, at least four basic modes 
of construction exist.274  The first concept she engages is Kant’s notion 
of the person as rights-holder.275  The rights-holder theory presupposes 
the person to be “a free and rational agent whose existence is an end in 
itself,” and entails a focus on “universal abstract rationality.”276  While 
this view underlies much of what we think being a “person” means, 
Radin points out that the Kantian view divorces the person from any 
idiosyncratic characteristics or “individual histories that differentiate one 
[person] from another.”277 
 
 269. Id. at 961, 968. 
 270. Id. at 968-69. 
 271. Id. at 979. 
 272. See generally id. at 961-65 (differentiating between good and bad identification of 
personal property objects to determine whether such objects are deserving of legal recognition as 
personhood interests). 
 273. Id. at 964-65. 
 274. Id. at 962-64. 
 275. Id. at 967 (considering the individual through the prism of Kantian individual rationality); 
see John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 9 J. PHIL. 515, 533-35 (1980).  See 
generally IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (T. 
Abbott trans., 1949). 
 276. Radin, supra note 50, at 962, 962 n.12 (citing IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (T. Abbott trans., 1949)). 
 277. Id. 
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A second “classical” view of the person is the Lockean definition of 
“a person as ‘a thinking intelligent being, [one] that has reason and 
reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in 
different times and places.’”278  Thus, for Locke, individual self 
consciousness and subjective personal memory are the essential 
attributes of the person.279  A third available view, which might conflict 
with or augment the Lockean rationale, holds an “individual’s ability to 
project a continuing life plan into the future [to be] as important as 
memory or continuing consciousness.”280 
Against these dualist models, which see the person or the self as 
separate and distinct from the physical body, Radin contrasts what might 
be called the “physicalist” notion of the person typified by 
Wittgenstein.281  In the latter’s view, the dualist approaches might 
describe a criterion of personhood, but they do not capture its whole 
essence unless the disembodied self is continuously housed in a human 
body.282 
After dispensing with several subspecies of the individualist model 
of the person, Radin turns to the communitarian model of the person, 
which rejects the “individualistic worldview that flowered in western 
society with the industrial revolution.”283  Communitarians find 
individualist models unsatisfactory because, advocates contend, 
“[p]ersons are embedded in language, history, and culture, which are 
social creations; [and that] there can be no such thing as a person 
without society.”284 
Yet after tracing these various alternatives, Radin does not make an 
unconditional election between the two broad categories, nor among the 
specific theories that fall under each heading.285  While Radin nominally 
chooses “the more traditional, individual-oriented theories,”286 she 
proposes an analysis that remains sensitive “to the role of groups both as 
 
 278. Id. at 963 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING bk. 
II, ch. XXVII, § 9 (A. Fraser ed., 1894) (1690)). 
 279. Id. at 963, 963 n.15 (citing Antony Flew, Locke and the Problem of Personal Identity, 26 
PHIL. 53 (1951)). 
 280. Id. at 963; see, e.g., BERNARD WILLIAMS, PERSONS, CHARACTER AND MORALITY in  
MORAL LUCK (1981). 
 281. Radin, supra note 50, at 963.  See generally LUDWIG JOSEF JOHANN WITTGENSTEIN, THE 
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G. Pitcher ed., 1966). 
 282. WILLIAMS, supra note 280; Radin, supra note 50, at 963. 
 283. Radin, supra note 50, at 965. 
 284. Id.; see, e.g., J. HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 95, 100 
(Thomas McCarthy trans., 1979). 
 285. Radin, supra note 50, at 965. 
 286. Id. 
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constituted by and as constitutive of persons.”287  Thus, Radin’s model 
of the person may be the best of all approaches, an amalgam of all that is 
theoretically implied by the Kantian, Lockean, future character structure, 
and Wittgensteinian physicalist ideas of the person, together with the 
increased resolution offered by the communitarian consideration of the 
person in the richness of his or her social context.  The unifying force 
that she applies is the thesis that property is essential to defining the 
person in both individualistic and communitarian traditions, and she 
demonstrates how this conception of the person allows us to extract 
important insights across theoretical lines.288 
Yet this admittedly incomplete sampling of the available theories of 
the person is also a limitation on Radin’s model and a source of potential 
critique.289  Most saliently, Radin’s choice of the classical individualistic 
view, even as nuanced as it is, is sure to be unpersuasive to any 
theoretical purists of either the individualist or communitarian type.290  
In addition, the “thorough empiricist and metaphysical skeptic[s]” may 
be out in the cold, for Radin’s subsequent discussion of the property 
model of the person does not seem to incorporate or engage those 
competing theories.291 
I do not dispute these critiques.  Rather, they are flagged and 
acknowledged here, but only insofar as is necessary to show that I have 
made a philosophical choice to follow Radin’s lead toward the personal 
property perspective.  I find Radin’s treatment of the philosophical 
spectrum sufficiently robust to support further consideration of her 
property model, but I proceed with an awareness that this assumption is 
being made. 
 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. at 966. 
 289. There are several other specific doctrinal critiques leveled at Radin’s personhood model.  
For example, Stephen Schnably contends: 
[T]he law can never simply implement some consensus regarding property and 
personhood [because t]he social constitution of personhood is always at stake when 
issues of property and commodification are decided.  A theory that brackets moral issues 
from legal ones overlooks the manner in which exercises of power help shape the 
consensual norm that is supposedly being taken as a guide.  To avoid that circularity, 
legal theorists must focus on the conflict that can always be found beneath the surface of 
apparent consensus. 
Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin’s Theory of Property and 
Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REV. 347, 353 (1993). 
 290. See id. at 357 (“Beyond these general outlines [between individualism and 
communitarianism], Radin offers no comprehensive theory of the ideal of human flourishing.  
Rather, she offers particular judgments about particular issues.”). 
 291. Radin, supra note 50, at 964. 
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2.  Selecting a Theory of Property 
Radin compliments her selected theory of the person with a 
primarily Hegelian notion of property.292  Interestingly, perhaps because 
property, strictly defined, does not exist without reference to a person or 
persons (if assuming the communitarian perspective), her discussion of 
Hegel’s theory of property must begin with a discussion of the Hegelian 
theory of the person.293  The latter is construed as essentially Kantian—
the person is “simply an abstract autonomous entity capable of holding 
rights, a device for abstracting universal principles and hence by 
definition devoid of individuating characteristics.”294  This is subject to 
the same theoretical critique as the Kantian choice itself: the personhood 
“perspective assumes that persons are not persons except by virtue of 
those particulars, and therefore sees the person as the developed 
individual human being in the context of the external world.”295 
But Hegel’s related theory of property tends to avoid some of the 
Kantian limitations, and bears several strong indications that inform the 
personhood theory of property.296  Of greatest importance to Radin’s 
theory is Hegel’s idea that a person “is merely an abstract unit of free 
will or autonomy, [and] it has no concrete existence until that will acts 
on the external world.”297  “For Hegel, individuals could not become 
fully developed outside such [external] relationships,”298 and the 
Hegelian perspective is thus important to “a theory of personal property, 
because the concept of person in the theory of personal property refers to 
[that same] fully developed individual.”299 
Once Radin has established her Hegelian model of property, and 
identified the hybridized model of the person that will be used to inform 
that model of property, she need only demonstrate the capacity of the 
 
 292. Id. at 971-78, 971 n.49 (citing Stillman, Property, Freedom, and Individuality in Hegel’s 
and Marx’s Political Thought, in NOMOS XXII, PROPERTY 130 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds., 
1980)). 
 293. See id. at 972 (arguing that Hegel’s conception of the person “can be seen as consistent 
with the idea of personal property”). 
 294. Id. at 971. 
 295. Id. at 972. 
 296. See id. (arguing that Hegel’s theory understands an individual first in the realm of rights 
but then moves beyond to the concept of a whole person in the external world and therefore makes 
sense in the context of personal property). 
 297. Id. at 972 (“[T]he person must give its freedom an external sphere in order to exist as 
Idea.”).  Id. (quoting GEORG W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 41 (T. Knox trans., 1942)) 
(alteration in original).  “Since Hegel, like Plato, was an idealist, something must exist as Idea in 
order to be actualized or real.”  Id. at 972 n.52. 
 298. Id. at 975. 
 299. Id. 
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personal property model to set up the necessary dichotomy between 
good and bad, or between justified and less justified (or totally 
unjustified) property interests.300  She then delves into several extant 
theoretical critiques of property in order to prove the claim “that the 
common thread in these theories relates the stronger property claims to 
recognized indicia of personhood.  The personhood perspective can thus 
provide a dichotomy that captures this critical intuition explicitly and 
accurately.”301 
The theories presenting this common thread are the Marxist 
distinctions between property that is the fruit of the individual’s labor 
(justified) and that which is fruit of others’ toil (unjustified),302 and the 
Hobhousian dichotomy between property held for personal use 
(justified) and that which is held for “control of [other] persons through 
things” (unjustified).303  Radin relates both theories to personal property 
with the suggestion that Marx’s first-party-labor/third-party-toil 
dichotomy, and Hobhouse’s use/power dichotomy, track or replicate the 
personality theory’s dichotomy between personal property and fungible 
property in useful ways.304 
Radin also addresses utilitarian critiques of property, which have at 
their core the assumption that justifiable property entitlements are those 
which maximize efficiency and social welfare.305  Such utilitarian calculi 
do not superficially consider or predict property for personhood to be 
more valuable than fungible property because either may be efficiency-
maximizing or efficiency-diminishing.306  However, the utilitarian 
calculus has also produced a hierarchy of remedies that purport to reflect 
 
 300. See id. at 978-79 (noting that property that is used to create a fully developed individual is 
entitled to a stronger moral claim and more legal protection than other forms of property). 
   301. Id. at 979. 
 302. See id. at 981 (explaining how, under the Marxist approach, a property interest is only 
valid if the property was created by one’s own work); id. at 980 n.79 (citing KARL MARX & 
FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 1, 96 (Samuel Moore trans., Penguin Books 
1979) (1888)). 
 303. Id. at 980, 980 n.80 (citing Leonard Hobhouse, The Historical Evolution of Property, in 
Fact and in Idea, in PROPERTY: ITS DUTIES AND RIGHTS 3, 9-11 (2d ed. 1922)). 
 304. See id. (explaining that Hobhouse may associate property for use with personal property 
and that one can understand the Marxist theory in terms of personal property by positing that by 
laboring on resources one intends to bind up with one’s own life, he can more easily justify 
ownership than when he labors in order to later exchange the property). 
 305. Id. at 984. 
 306. Id. at 984 (arguing that there is no distinction between different kinds of entitlements 
under a utilitarian calculus); id. at 958 n.3 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
LAW (2d ed. 1977)); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 
(1967)). 
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this efficiency analysis, and it is here that personal property finds its 
entrée.307 
Utilitarian remedies for injury to property rights come in one of two 
basic flavors:  property rules or liability rules.308  Property rules are more 
protective of initial property-holder interests and more restrictive of 
potential invasions of that interest than are liability rules.309  The 
distinction between the rigor and content of each remedy scheme reflects 
an assumption in the utilitarian model that different levels of protection 
do exist, “without telling us which items deserve which levels.”310  
Personal property can be reconciled with the efficiency arguments 
underlying the property/liability rule distinction by positing personal 
property and fungible property as poles on the spectrum of rights that 
will be protected on one end by property rules and on the other end by 
liability rules, respectively.311  Thus, although personal property cannot 
wholly convert utilitarian property ideas into a holistic moral theory, it 
does provide some rough considerations relating remedial choices to the 
moral underpinnings of the personal/fungible property dichotomy. 
Finally, when confronting a welfare rights critique of property, 
Radin recognizes that the welfare rights model might encompass a 
concept of personhood by assuring citizens of “all entitlements 
necessary for personhood,”312 but this would produce a personhood 
theory of entitlements encompassing but not centering on property 
rights.313  Still, a personhood theory of property (as opposed to 
entitlements) may be analytically useful even in a welfare rights model if 
we believe that “[t]he attachment to things may be different from other 
necessities of personhood, and it may be worth noticing the difference 
sometimes, even though, by itself, it would not determine questions of 
just distribution.”314  Indeed, the personal property perspective can be 
immensely valuable because 
 
 307. Radin, supra note 50, at 984. 
 308. Id. at 984, 984 n.93 (citing Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972)). 
 309. See id. at 984-85 (distinguishing between those traditional property rights which are 
protected by a property rule and those that are protected merely by a liability rule). 
 310. Id. at 985. 
 311. See id. at 985-86 (outlining the starting point for a theory that divides those rights to 
property which are closely tied to personhood and, thus, should be entitled to greater protection, 
from those rights to property less tied to personhood and therefore entitled to less protection). 
 312. Id. at 990. 
 313. Id. (arguing that, under the welfare rights theory, the government could organize property 
rights around the concept of personhood and give everyone at minimum what is required for 
personhood). 
 314. Id. 
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a welfare rights theory incorporating property for personhood would 
suggest not only that government distribute largess in order to make it 
possible for people to buy property in which to constitute themselves 
but would further suggest that government should rearrange property 
rights so that fungible property of some people does not overwhelm the 
opportunities of the rest to constitute themselves in [personal] 
property.315 
The foregoing is a somewhat shallow recitation of Radin’s property 
for personhood theory and its bases, but it does tease out all the 
substantive nuances embedded within the theory that are necessary for 
me to now propose its extension and application to a theory of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
Before that application can be attempted, however, there are two 
ways in which Radin’s personhood perspective on property must be 
enhanced if it is to do the great work on the Fourth Amendment of which 
it is ultimately capable.  First, the personality theory of property must be 
pushed beyond its current focus on the “thing” or object in which 
property interests reside and must be forced to include intangible things 
or interests within its ambit.316  Second, although Radin broaches the 
topic of Fourth Amendment privacy and liberty,317 she does so in a 
purely positivist or descriptive fashion and does not develop the 
personhood model as a moral or normative framework within the Fourth 
Amendment context.318  Correcting these two shortcomings, and then 
employing the personhood normative model to evaluate the 
government’s present and future use of CCTs make up the bulk of the 
remainder of this Article.  The balance is spent buttressing the CCT 
discussion by applying my property-infused Fourth Amendment theory 
to a sampling of troubling criminal procedure standards, and then 
exploring more general considerations of the benefits of a property-
 
 315. Id. 
 316. Radin’s discussion is, in some ways oddly, expressly limited to a discussion of “things” 
that have form and substance, and she does not explicitly or implicitly develop a property rights 
regime that contends with what might be considered legitimate property interests in ephemeral and 
intangible items.  See generally id. at 991-1013 (naming homes and cars as examples of things in 
which a person could have a property interest, and objects and wealth as property that the 
government could take, none of which go beyond the tangible). 
 317. See id. at 991-1002 (discussing the Fourth Amendment in terms of the sanctity of the 
home, including liberty and privacy, residential tenancy, and homes and cars). 
 318. See generally id. at 996-1002 (focusing on the privacy element of the Fourth Amendment 
by describing the cases in which the Court protected it). 
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driven Fourth Amendment compared to our current creature of 
privacy.319 
B.  Personhood as Property Under the Fourth Amendment 
In order to make full use of the personhood perspective in Fourth 
Amendment analysis, it must be able to explain rights residing in 
tangible as well as intangible things.  Indeed, transcending the 
tangible/intangible distinction as a measure of Fourth Amendment 
interests was essentially the point, or at least part of the point, of the 
decision in Katz.320  The Court grounded its rejection of the 
government’s claim that only tangible things could be seized, in Fourth 
Amendment terms, on reasonable expectations of privacy.321  However, 
Katz nonetheless reflects the Court’s intuitive judgment that Mr. Katz’s 
conversation merited protection in spite of its ephemeral nature.322 
One need not reject that aspect of Katz that collapsed any 
distinction between tangible and intangible property even when 
preparing to jettison the related privacy rationale.323  The only coherent 
theory for maintaining the distinction came from constitutional 
textualists like Hugo Black,324 and similar arguments have not 
 
 319. See infra Part III.C (describing how the personal information property theory would apply 
to situations like open fields, aerial surveillance, dog sniffs, and thermal imaging). 
 320. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967) (holding that the Fourth Amendment 
“protects people, not places” and furthermore “protects individual privacy against certain kinds of 
governmental intrusion”). 
 321. In rejecting Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 133 (1942) (holding that government 
eavesdropping without a physical trespass did not violate the Fourth Amendment), Justice Harlan 
stated that its “limitation on Fourth Amendment protection is, in the present day, bad physics as 
well as bad law, for reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by electronic as well as 
physical invasion.”  Katz, 389 U.S. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 322. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  Justice Harlan argued: 
The critical fact in this case is that “one who occupies it, [a telephone booth] shuts the 
door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to 
assume” that his conversation is not being intercepted.  The point is not that the booth is 
“accessible to the public” at other times, but that it is a temporarily private place whose 
momentary occupants’ expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as 
reasonable. 
Id. at 361-62 (citations omitted) (alteration in original). 
 323. See id. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring) (relating the rejection of the distinction between the 
physical and the non-physical to privacy in order to support the notion that an electronic invasion is 
as intrusive as a physical invasion). 
 324. Justice Black phrased his textualist objections as follows: 
The first clause [of the Fourth Amendment] protects “persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”  These words connote the idea 
of tangible things with size, form, and weight, things capable of being searched, seized, 
or both.  The second clause of the Amendment still further establishes its Framers’ 
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resurfaced since they were squarely rejected in Katz and the cases that 
followed.325  For purposes of harmonizing the Fourth Amendment with a 
personality theory of property, it would seem vitally important to 
continue to disregard the tangible/intangible dichotomy as irrelevant.  
Although Radin’s model is at all times expressly limited to things or 
objects as property that may house personhood, her premise that there 
are things external to the individual that are nevertheless “closely bound 
up with personhood because they are part of the way we constitute 
ourselves as continuing personal entities in the world”326 has no inherent 
conceptual preference regarding an aspect of personal property’s 
permanence.327 
Once the line between tangible and intangible things is erased, the 
personhood model can then be used to think about what things qualify as 
intangible property of personhood.  Here again, I want to use what is 
useful about the Katz revolution without getting bogged down in its 
privacy detour.328  The Katz case tested the Fourth Amendment’s ability 
to deal concretely with eavesdropping, a non-trespassory seizure of an 
intangible good in the form of his telephone conversation.329  In trying to 
distill what is so important about that telephone conversation as to 
render it beyond the government’s reach, it should be clear that it was 
neither the mode of the collection nor the nature of the thing collected 
that shaped the Court’s judgment about the value of the right invaded.330  
Instead, the Court chose to declare Mr. Katz’s conversation within the 
 
purpose to limit its protection to tangible things by providing that no warrants shall issue 
but those “particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized.”  A conversation overheard by eavesdropping, whether by plain snooping or 
wiretapping, is not tangible and, under the normally accepted meanings of the words, can 
neither be searched nor seized. 
Id. at 365 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 325. Compare California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986) (holding in part that the Fourth 
Amendment should not be limited to proscribing only physical intrusions onto private property), 
with Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998) (concluding that a person has no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the home of a third party, which the Court articulates does not violate the 
principle announced in Katz). 
 326. Radin, supra note 50, at 959. 
 327. See id. at 960 (discussing the personhood theory in terms of “things” in the “external 
world,” but not adding anything more as to the requirements of the permanent aspects of these 
“things”). 
 328. Supra notes 320-322 and accompanying text. 
 329. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 372 (Black, J., dissenting) (framing the majority and concurring 
opinions in terms of the distinction between tangibles and intangibles and asserting that the real 
holding means that “eavesdropping is subject to Fourth Amendment restrictions and . . . 
conversations can be ‘seized’”). 
 330. See id. at 353 (relying on the speaker’s interests instead of the mode of collection or the 
thing seized). 
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scope of the Fourth Amendment in spite of those considerations, and 
certainly not because of them.331 
Rather, what seems most important about Mr. Katz’s conversation, 
and deserving of Fourth Amendment attention, was that it contained 
sensitive information.332  The Court’s analytical method in Katz, and 
perhaps in many (or all) other Fourth Amendment cases, is to shape its 
rule guided by the perceived value to the individual of the information 
gathered by law enforcement and the latter’s competing claim of 
entitlement thereto.333  This suggests that one can bypass trespassory 
considerations and the tangible/intangible object dichotomy without 
devolving to a privacy framework.  The instrumental outcome of Katz 
could be achieved by emphasizing that the police interrupted or 
interfered with the flow of Mr. Katz’s targeted delivery of information 
and not necessarily his privacy. 
Assuming that the right to control and direct the flow of 
information is the locus of the interest being protected in Katz, and 
proposing that information is the locus of the interest most relevant to 
the Fourth Amendment,334 we still need a coherent moral or normative 
model for assessing the existence and relative strength of claims to 
information or, as Radin supplies for good and bad property interests, a 
 
 331. See id. (holding that the Fourth Amendment did apply in this instance because the 
government’s actions “violated the privacy upon which he [Mr. Katz] justifiably relied” and 
dismissing the concern that these activities could not constitute a seizure because no physical 
trespass occurred). 
 332. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (identifying the “critical fact” in the case as Mr. 
Katz’s assumption that his conversation would remain confidential, and that the information he 
expressed would not be captured or subsequently disclosed). 
 333. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 792 
n.2 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 776 (Stevens, J., concurring)) (“For if the liberty to 
make certain decisions with respect to contraception without governmental constraint is 
‘fundamental,’ it is not only because those decisions are ‘serious’ and ‘important’ to the individual, 
but also because some value of privacy or individual autonomy that is somehow implicit in the 
scheme of ordered liberties established by the Constitution supports a judgment that such decisions 
are none of government’s business.”); Hudgens v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 424 U.S. 507, 542 
(1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“No one would seriously question the legitimacy of the values of 
privacy and individual autonomy traditionally associated with privately owned property.  But 
property that is privately owned is not always held for private use, and when a property owner 
opens his property to public use the force of those values diminishes.”). 
 334. Distinguishing between “privacy” and “privity” of communication, DeFilippis argues that 
the Court in Katz “failed to acknowledge . . . that privity, and not merely privacy, is central to any 
plausible understanding of [Mr.] Katz’s claims” because one cannot understand the need to protect 
the privacy of Mr. Katz’s phone conversation without first identifying the relevant privity links.  
Andrew J. DeFilippis, Securing Informationships: Recognizing a Right to Privity in Fourth 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 115 YALE L.J. 1086, 1103 (2006).  Thus, the inherent value of the 
conversation is not necessarily just the conversation itself. 
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rationale for deciding which interests in information to protect and 
when.335 
Katz’s privacy norm purports to do just that.  Mr. Katz conveyed 
information during a conversation in which he reflected a sufficiently 
strong interest such that he was “entitled to assume that the words he 
utter[ed] . . . [would] not be broadcast to the world.”336  This may be 
explained in a positivist way simply by saying that Mr. Katz exhibited 
an expectation of privacy that society would find reasonable, but neither 
with this statement nor elsewhere in the opinion does the Court provide a 
true normative tool for decision-making.337  In this sense, the privacy 
rationale was a descriptive model that explained the outcome in Katz 
nicely, but it is not sufficient.338 
Applying a personhood perspective to this informational quandary 
would, in contrast to the above, provide the Court a more effective way 
to determine what sort of interests the Fourth Amendment should protect 
and to what extent.  The personality theory of property, once open to 
considering intangible property as possibly personal, would differentiate 
informational interests based on the extent to which the information is 
“closely bound up with personhood”339 or otherwise forms “part of the 
way we constitute ourselves as continuing entities in the world.”340  This 
would honor my own intuition that information in general, and specific 
kinds of information in particular, are essential to or even a 
manifestation of personhood.  We might call this extrapolated theory 
“property in the information of personhood,” or more succinctly, 
“personal informational property.” 
Similarly to Radin’s personality theory of property, my personal 
informational property theory of the Fourth Amendment supplies the 
two basic requirements of a complete theory of rights: it gives us a moral 
justification for recognizing rights and a mode for their specific 
delineation.  Just as Radin suggests that property rights vested in certain 
 
 335. See Radin, supra note 50, at 1014-15 (outlining the conclusion that personal property 
interests should be prima facie protected while fungible property interests should be unprotected 
when viewed against personhood interests). 
  336. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). 
 337. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining the two-part test that requires a 
subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable and limiting the rest of the 
analysis to subjective intentions and society’s expectations). 
 338. See id. at 365 (Black, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s reliance on privacy as a 
“nebulous subject”). 
 339. Radin, supra note 50, at 959. 
 340. Id. 
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things are essential to the realization of personhood,341 I contend that the 
right to convey or withhold information is also a matter affecting the 
development of a full person.  The personal informational property 
analogy to the distinction between good or justifiable and bad or 
unjustifiable interests in property, which relies on the level of connection 
between the person and the thing,342 is a focus on the level of connection 
between the person and information in order to gauge its worth.  That 
information which is closely bound up with identity, or necessary to the 
development of the fully realized person, like certain types of property, 
is deserving of the most stringent protection.  Information less bound up 
or not bound up with identity or personhood is not personal 
informational property, but (a la Radin) rather might be called fungible 
informational property and is less deserving or perhaps not deserving of 
constitutional protection.343 
The propertized Fourth Amendment would therefore look roughly 
as follows: search and seizure law for cases involving things or tangible 
objects will protect the individual against government intrusion most 
aggressively when the thing subject to investigation is rightly considered 
personal property, and least so or not at all if the interest invaded deals 
with fungible property.  However, even if the thing interfered with is 
fungible, it may be the repository, source, or locale for the production of 
information.  Therefore, the second step in the propertized Fourth 
Amendment’s framework would be to assess whether the search or 
seizure of a tangible thing, personal or fungible, interferes with 
informational property rights relevant to personhood that may emanate 
or flow from the tangible property.  If the information is deemed 
personal informational property, it is aggressively protected and if it is 
better characterized as fungible informational property it will be less 
protected.  A third aspect of the Fourth Amendment which embraces the 
personality theory of property would come into play when only 
intangible items are seized or virtual spaces are searched.  Here, much 
like step two, the inquiry is whether the information seized constitutes 
personal informational property, fungible informational property, or 
perhaps is not property at all, and the level of protection would likewise 
 
 341. See id. (stating that “[m]ost people possess certain objects they feel are almost part of 
themselves”). 
 342. See id. at 959-60 (separating personal from fungible property on the basis of whether one 
is bound up with the property or whether it is replaceable). 
 343. See id. at 979, 979 n.294 (arguing that dualist theories that offer greater and lesser 
protection to different kinds of property all center on indicia of personhood). 
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vary with the level of intimacy between the individual’s sense of self (or 
personhood) and the information at risk. 
This framework for the Fourth Amendment thus allows the Court to 
develop clear rules, declaring certain types of personal property and 
personal informational property absolutely protected, other types of 
personal property and personal informational property strongly but not 
absolutely protected, and fungible property and fungible informational 
property less protected or perhaps even unprotected altogether.  At the 
most protective end of the spectrum you find Radin’s personal 
property344 and my related personal informational property.  Personal 
property or personal informational property will be protected absolutely 
when the individual cannot tolerate any interference with such property 
without experiencing severe harm or loss of aspects of her personhood, 
or disruption of her development as a full person.345  By my judgment, a 
useful nexus for absolute protection certainly exists where the property 
being deprived or molested is personhood itself. 
Populating the space between the poles are personal property and 
personal informational property with which the government might 
interfere without causing severe hardship to or loss of aspects of the 
individual’s personhood, or where the risk of harm or loss is 
substantially outweighed by overriding law enforcement obligations to 
engage in the challenged behavior.  Generally speaking, these 
considerations will parallel or be resolved by resort to the remaining 
familiar aspects of the Fourth Amendment that this Article does not 
challenge, most importantly the notions of suspicion,346 the warrant 
 
 344. See id. at 986 (describing the continuum of property rights from personal to fungible). 
 345. Id. at 959.  Radin states that: 
[we] may gauge the strength or significance of someone’s relationship with an object by 
the kind of pain that would be occasioned by its loss.  On this view, an object is closely 
related to one’s personhood if its loss causes pain that cannot be relieved by the object’s 
replacement . . . . For instance, if a wedding ring is stolen from a jeweler, insurance 
proceeds can reimburse the jeweler, but if a wedding ring is stolen from a loving wearer, 
the price of a replacement will not restore the status quo—perhaps no amount of money 
can do so. 
Id. 
 346. For an explanation of the probable cause standard of suspicion, see Texas v. Brown, 460 
U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925); Brinegar v. 
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).  The Court in Brown states: 
[P]robable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard.  It merely requires that the facts 
available to the officer would “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief” that 
certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it 
does not demand any showing that such belief be correct or more likely true than false.  
A “practical, nontechnical probability” that incriminating evidence is involved is all that 
is required. 
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preference347 and exceptions doctrines,348 and overriding concerns of 
reasonableness,349 although each of these concepts would have to be 
modified slightly in order to incorporate personhood-related property in 
the place formerly held by privacy.350 
Finally, on the least protected end of the spectrum, you have 
fungible property not giving rise to an interest in personal informational 
property, you have the least valuable forms of fungible informational 
property, and you have that information in which no property interest 
exists at all.  The level of protection from official surveillance enjoyed 
 
Brown, 460 U.S. at 742.  For the less stringent standard of reasonable suspicion, see United States v. 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984); Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)) (holding that reasonable suspicion entails “‘some minimal level of objective 
justification’ for making the stop,” that is, “something more than an ‘inchoate’ and unparticularized 
suspicion or ‘hunch,’” but less than level of suspicion required for probable cause). 
 347. This preference can be summed up as follows: 
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is 
not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable 
men draw from evidence.  Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be 
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer 
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.  Any assumption that 
evidence sufficient to support a magistrate’s disinterested determination to issue a search 
warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the 
Amendment to a nullity and leave the people’s homes secure only in the discretion of 
police officers . . . . When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of 
search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government 
enforcement agent. 
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). 
 348. While all searches must be reasonable, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
reasonableness does not require the police to obtain search warrants before conducting every search.  
See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001) (explaining that “[w]hen faced with special law 
enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like,” the Court 
has carved out exceptions to the warrant requirement).  The Court has recognized numerous such 
exceptions.  See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (exigent circumstances—community 
caretaking exception); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (search incident to arrest 
exception); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent exception); Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plain view exception); Terry, 392 U.S. at 1 (stop and frisk 
exception); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (exigent circumstances—”hot pursuit” 
exception); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (exigent circumstances—evanescent 
evidence exception); Carroll, 267 U.S. at 132 (automobile exception). 
 349. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19; 
United States v. Brignom-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)) (“The touchstone of our analysis under 
the Fourth Amendment is always ‘the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular 
governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’  Reasonableness . . . depends ‘on a balance 
between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary 
interference by law officers.’”). 
 350. This is so only inasmuch as the various competing interests that are weighed or compared 
in each of these contexts must now include a consideration of the consequences of the challenged 
action in terms of the individual ability to become a fully realized person.  See supra note 343 and 
accompanying text. 
64
Akron Law Review, Vol. 42 [2009], Iss. 3, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol42/iss3/6
11-HALLIBURTON_COPYFORPRINTER_FINAL.DOC 4/27/2009  12:44 PM 
2009] HOW PRIVACY KILLED KATZ 867 
by property interests on this end of the spectrum could also be expressed 
in terms of the Fourth Amendment’s three related assessment strategies 
(suspicion, warrant clause, and reasonableness),351 but would in addition 
include things or information meriting no assessment whatsoever. 
This personal property model for the Fourth Amendment produces 
a spectrum replicating that which is currently employed in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, but it would draw lines or distinctions at 
different points because personal property as a normative framework 
grounds very different value judgments than privacy purports to.  What 
follows are several examples of how different those lines would be if the 
personal property and personal informational property theories of the 
Fourth Amendment were deployed, and some suggestions as to why that 
deployment would be a very good thing. 
C.  Personal Informational Property and the Challenges of the Fourth 
Amendment 
The value of the theory proposed here depends on whether a 
propertized Fourth Amendment yields a workable moral standard for 
regulating police intrusions on people’s freedom.  The moral theory will 
be further developed and critically evaluated through a review of how a 
Fourth Amendment oriented towards personal property would deal with 
the threat of CCTs and also resolve a number of other very thorny 
doctrinal questions. 
1.  Personal Informational Property and CCTs 
In earlier sections of this Article352 and previous writings on this 
topic,353 I claim that the government’s use of CCTs, and the 
development of CCTs in general, raise alarming possibilities for 
invading an individual’s mind.354  Sensing the depth of that intrusion, 
and on the basis of a perceived social moral consensus on the importance 
of cognitive liberty and mental solitude, I called for an absolute 
prohibition on the non-consensual use of CCTs by government actors.355 
 
 351. Supra notes 346-349. 
 352. See supra Part I (introducing the problems associated with government use of CCTs and 
describing how this use is incompatible with principles on which the Framers built our government). 
 353. See generally Halliburton, supra note 3. 
 354. See id. at 310 (describing alarm as one of the primary responses to finding out about the 
existence and use of CCTs). 
 355. See generally id. at 313, 363-64. 
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My propertized theory of the Fourth Amendment does this, and it 
offers a normative legal justification for the interdisciplinary intuitive 
moral consensus that absolute protection of cognitive liberty is 
absolutely necessary.  Using the guideposts offered by Radin,356 I think 
it is easy to see (and rather difficult to dispute) that our thoughts, our 
internal mental processes, and the cognitive landscape of our ideas and 
intentions are so closely bound up with the self that they are essential to 
our ongoing existence and manifestation of a fully developed personal 
identity.357  As such, they are inherently and uncontrovertibly personal 
information property deserving absolutist protections because any 
interference with these informational assets cannot be tolerated by the 
individual.358  Many would therefore argue that capturing thoughts, 
spying on mental processes, and invading cognitive landscapes with 
CCTs deprive the individual not only of property related to personhood, 
but of personhood altogether.  If either is the case, then the personal 
property theory of Fourth Amendment rights provides the normative and 
analytical means necessary to strictly circumscribe non-consensus use of 
CCTs and, thankfully, keeps big brother out of an individual’s head. 
 
 356. See Radin, supra note 50, at 959 (setting out the basic idea that some forms of property 
can be so bound up with a person that they constitute part of personhood); see also supra notes 339-
343 and accompanying text. 
 357. Albert Bandura, Social Cognitive Theory, in 6 ANNALS OF CHILD DEV. 1, 9 (R. Vasta ed., 
1989), available at http://www.des.emory.edu/mfp/Bandura1989ACD.pdf.  Bandura writes: 
People process and transform passing experiences by means of verbal, imaginal and 
other symbols into cognitive models of reality that serve as guides for judgment and 
action.  It is through symbols that people give meaning, form, and continuity to the 
experiences they have had.  Symbols serve as the vehicle of thought.  Cognitive 
representations of experiences in knowledge structures provide the substance for 
thinking.  And rules and strategies provide the cognitive operations for manipulating 
knowledge for different purposes.  By symbolically manipulating the information 
derived from personal and vicarious experiences, people gain understanding of causal 
relationships and expand their knowledge. 
Id. 
For similar opinions on this subject, see Margaret S. Mahler & John B. McDevitt, Thoughts on the 
Emergence of the Sense of Self, with Particular Emphasis on the Body Self, 30 J. AM. 
PSYCHOANALYTIC ASS’N 827 (Am. Psychoanalytic Ass’n ed., 1982) (explaining the process of 
development of the sense of self as exhibited by disturbances studied by clinical psychologists); Leo 
A. Spiegel, The Self, the Sense of Self, and Perception, in 14 THE PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE 
CHILD 81-82 (Ruth S. Eissler et al. eds., 1959) (describing the study of disturbances in one’s self-
feeling, especially disturbances in one’s feeling of personal identity, and discussing how one carries 
one’s sense of self around with him). 
 358. See generally Christine M. Korsgaard, Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A 
Kantian Response to Parfit, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 101, 101 (1989) (claiming that “[a]ny acceptable 
moral philosophy must take both sides of our nature into account, and tell us both how people ought 
to be treated and what we ought to do”). 
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I do find, however, that I am forced to admit of one caveat to this 
absolutist position.  It appears that even a Fourth Amendment embracing 
the personal property norm leaves the door open to an emergency 
exception to the restriction on CCTs.  Perhaps because it is such a 
wonderfully hypothetical foil, one that almost certainly cannot occur in 
the real world due to the fantastic nature of the assumed ideal 
circumstances, the “ticking time bomb” thought experiment is almost 
invincible.359  But assuming all those ideal circumstances—a certain 
threat of massive harm, complete confidence in the identity of the person 
possessing information that would in fact avert disaster, and no other 
avenues for discovery of that vital information—forcible application of 
CCTs for the purpose of preventing an impending calamity would be 
tolerable even under this proposed Fourth Amendment theory.  The 
theoretical commitments of personal property under the Fourth 
Amendment would still be useful because they provide clarity to our 
understanding of the individual interest at stake in such a situation and 
will allow for more accurate balancing against the public interest in 
safety and security.  Even if one individual’s personhood is disturbed or 
destroyed, a balance of harms argument may permit this to literally 
preserve the persons and personhood of thousands of others.  That said, I 
am confident enough that the ticking time bomb challenge is exceptional 
enough (and so ubiquitously employed) that it does not otherwise 
undermine the positions taken here. 
2.  A Personal Property Perspective on the Fourth Amendment’s 
Weak Spots 
In order to consider the value of the personal property model of the 
Fourth Amendment outside the narrow context of CCTs, while still 
setting some reasonable limits on the scope of the consideration that 
avoids revisiting and rewriting every Fourth Amendment decision on the 
 
 359. The “ticking time bomb” scenario is a thought experiment undoubtedly familiar to most 
law students educated in the United States or United Kingdom.  It is a hypothetical factual 
circumstance designed to allow an abstract discussion of the legal and moral prohibitions on the 
official use of torture, as well as potential exceptions to those prohibitions.  The essence of the 
hypothetical involves government agents who possess reliable information regarding the existence 
of a ticking time bomb, but not its location, and have in custody a suspect who they believe can 
provide the information necessary to avoid a public disaster.  The essence of the question is whether 
it would be preferable to use undesirable interrogation techniques, like torture, if doing so would 
prevent the impending loss of life.  For more on this scenario and its various implications, see ALAN 
M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE 
CHALLENGE 131-63 (Yale Univ. Press 2002). 
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books, I want to confine this section to evaluation of how personal 
property and personal informational property would resolve three 
specific doctrinal questions previously considered from a privacy 
standpoint.  This strategy is chosen because of the reality that the 
heartland cases under the Fourth Amendment, either of the privacy-
driven or the property-driven species, are easy calls to make.  The 
warrantless invasion of the home, for example, is unconstitutional using 
either privacy or personal property, and this is not going to help 
elucidate the substantive differences between the two.  So what follows 
is a review of how a personal property Fourth Amendment norm would 
resolve the thorny cases at the margins, and some arguments as to why 
these outcomes are superior to what Katz and privacy have to offer. 
a.  The Open Fields Doctrine 
In Oliver v. United States,360 the Court reaffirmed what had long 
been known as the open fields doctrine.361  According to this manner of 
thinking about the scope of the Fourth Amendment, non-public land 
outside of the house that can be labeled an open field, as opposed to the 
complimentary notion of curtilage, is wholly unprotected against 
uninvited observation and intrusion.362  The foundation of the open field 
doctrine is actually the 1924 Supreme Court decision in Hester v. United 
States,363 which of course predates Katz and its introduction of the 
privacy rationale into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.364  Hester 
presented the same question as Oliver,365 and rendered the rule on which 
Oliver would later rely: open fields are not deserving of Fourth 
Amendment protection of any sort.366  According to Justice Powell, who 
wrote for the Oliver majority: 
 
 360. 466 U.S. 170 (1984). 
 361. The Court expressed this position in Hester v. United States: 
The defendant’s own acts, and those of his associates, disclosed the jug, the jar and the 
bottle—and there was no seizure in the sense of the law when the officers examined the 
contents of each after it had been abandoned. . . . [T]he special protection accorded by 
the Fourth Amendment to the people in their “persons, houses, papers and effects,” is not 
extended to the open fields, [which is where the police discovered the whiskey]. 
265 U.S. 57, 58-59 (1924). 
 362. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180. 
 363. 265 U.S. 57 (1924). 
 364. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (articulating a 
test for when the Fourth Amendment would apply based on subject and objective expectations of 
privacy). 
 365. Hester, 265 U.S. at 58; see Oliver, 466 U.S. at 173 (addressing the vitality of the “open 
fields” doctrine). 
 366. Hester, 265 U.S. at 59. 
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[t]he rule announced in Hester v. United States was founded upon the 
explicit language of the Fourth Amendment.  That amendment 
indicates with some precision the places and things encompassed by its 
protections.  As Justice Holmes explained for the Court in his 
characteristically laconic style:  “[T]he special protection accorded by 
the Fourth Amendment to the people in their ‘persons, houses, papers 
and effects,’ is not extended to open fields.  The distinction between 
the latter and the house is as old as the common law.”367 
This strict textualist construction of the Fourth Amendment was 
typical of the Court in the first half of the twentieth century,368 but it was 
explicitly rejected when Katz moved beyond this literalist treatment to 
protect an interest clearly not enumerated in the text.369  Justice Black 
dissented from the Katz opinion on these very same textualist grounds,370 
and the Court has never looked back at this narrow, crabbed view of the 
amendment as a viable analytical approach.371  In spite of this, Oliver 
revisited and reaffirmed the Hester rule seventeen years after Katz was 
decided, and refused to apply the Fourth Amendment to open fields 
primarily because of their a-textual status.372  Only upon reaching that 
aspect of the holding did the Court begin to consider privacy as an 
independent basis of decision,373 and when it did so, it pronounced the 
meaning of privacy in purely subjective and conclusory terms. 
[O]pen fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities 
that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government 
interference or surveillance.  There is no societal interest in protecting 
 
 367. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 176 (citing Hester, 265 U.S. at 59). 
 368. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 426 (1981) (plurality opinion); Payton v. New York, 
445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 178-80 (1969).  As these 
cases decided after Katz indicate, Katz’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard did not sever 
Fourth Amendment doctrine from the Amendment’s language.  See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, 
Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 668-93 (1999) (tracing the 
appearance of “unreasonable searches and seizures” in the textual evolution of the state search and 
seizure provisions as well as the framing of the Fourth Amendment itself); Lawrence M. Solan, 
Learning Our Limits: The Decline of Textualism in Statutory Cases, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 235, 272-75 
(1997) (criticizing a contextual interpretation of statutes based on the “ordinary” meaning of words). 
 369. Supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text. 
 370. In his dissenting opinion in Katz, Justice Black took a strong position against this more 
expansive reading of the Fourth Amendment.  See supra note 124 (quoting Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 373 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting)). 
 371. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 176-77; see also JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 19-20 (1966) 
(discussing interpretations of the Fourth Amendment based on history). 
 372. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 176-77 (reasoning that the text of the Fourth Amendment cannot 
possibly be read to include open fields). 
 373. See id. at 177-78 (analyzing “open fields” under the privacy doctrine established in Katz). 
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the privacy of those activities . . . . Moreover, . . . [i]t is not generally 
true that fences or “No Trespassing” signs effectively bar the public 
from viewing open fields in rural areas.  And [the parties] concede that 
the public and police lawfully may survey lands from the air.  For 
these reasons, the asserted expectation of privacy in open fields is not 
an expectation that “society recognizes as reasonable.”374 
This passage encapsulates the flawed nature of the doctrine and 
demonstrates the clear causative connections between those flaws and 
the Court’s privacy basis for interpreting the Fourth Amendment.  At the 
outset, the Court purports to limit the Fourth Amendment explicitly to 
houses, persons, papers, and effects when this is irreconcilable with Katz 
and all Katz-based precedent.375  By seeking to so limit the Fourth 
Amendment so late in the game, the Court is implicitly demonstrating 
the weakness of the privacy rationale by its inability to overcome or 
displace a form of textualism antithetical to privacy norms. 
The Oliver opinion also typified how privacy discussions allow the 
Court to define societal norms and values without any reference to 
established objective standards or actual public opinion, even though 
“our societal understanding that certain areas deserve the most 
scrupulous protection from government invasion”376 is a factor this very 
same Court declares to be relevant “[i]n assessing the degree to which a 
search infringes upon individual privacy.”377  The arbitrary and 
unsupported conclusion about the customary setting for intimate 
activities worthy of Fourth Amendment protection, and regarding the 
societal interest in open fields as such a setting, are consequences of the 
fact that the privacy theory of the Fourth Amendment does not demand 
reference to society’s actual normative commitments.378 
 
 374. Id. at 179. 
 375. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967) (“What a person knowingly exposes 
to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment Protection.  But 
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public may be constitutionally 
protected.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 
(1989) (discussing Fourth Amendment protections in the context of surveillance effected by use of 
helicopter); Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237 (1986) (discussing Fourth 
Amendment protections in the context of surveillance involving high-resolution long range 
photographic devices); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (discussing Fourth 
Amendment protections in the context of surveillance effected by use of fixed-wing aircraft); United 
States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-16 (1984) (discussing Fourth Amendment protections in the 
context of surveillance employing electronic “beepers”). 
 376. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178. 
 377. Id. 
 378. See Colb, supra note 198, at 130 (doubting the Court’s assertion that “no trespassing” 
signs have no effect on society’s privacy expectations in open fields). 
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Both the assertion that fences and no trespassing signs are not 
always effective to block the public’s view of open fields, and the 
importance attributed to the fact that land can be surveyed from the air, 
are iterations of another conceptual flaw in the Fourth Amendment.379  
The Court seeks to show with this discussion that privacy expectations 
are unreasonable because (1) people other than the police might have 
viewed the defendants’ open fields, and (2) the defendants arguably 
assumed some risk that their fields would be viewed by others.380  The 
fallacies of these two assertions are myriad and they are the product of 
privacy.381  Relying on the ineffectiveness of fences and signs allows the 
Court to treat a speculative and distinguishable partial loss of 
confidentiality as an excuse for imposing a constructive loss of all 
confidentiality in all things.  This is because privacy is construed as an 
all-or-nothing proposition.382 
Moreover, by premising the propriety of law enforcement conduct 
upon the possibility of anti-social and unlawful private behavior, the 
Court uses privacy to facilitate complete disregard for well established 
social moral beliefs even when they are clearly expressed in the positive 
law.383  This of course cuts the privacy-based Fourth Amendment loose 
from any links to the shared social values that define a system of ordered 
liberty and which are supposedly at the heart of the privacy expectations 
it protects.384 
 
 379. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179 (holding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
open fields because they can be surveyed from the air and “no trespassing” signs do not stop the 
public from viewing them). 
 380. Id. 
 381. Id.  Colb criticizes this line of reasoning: 
Significantly, the Court in Oliver reasoned against the privacy of the open field by 
appealing to social norms about trespass.  Even on such reasoning, it is almost certainly 
not the case that everyone feels free to violate the law against trespass.  The Court’s 
observation that people blithely trespass on open fields, moreover, might not extend to 
land as enclosed as Oliver’s was.  The fact that such trespass was criminal ought 
likewise to have undermined the idea that police did not engage in wrongdoing—that the 
public (and therefore the police as well) had somehow been invited to walk around in 
Oliver’s field.  By doing private things in his field, Oliver might well have taken a risk of 
exposure, much as the subway-train sleeper risks the theft of his wallet.  Oliver’s taking 
this risk, however, should not entitle a trespasser to enter onto his field any more than it 
would entitle a thief to pick a passenger’s pocket. 
Colb, supra note 198, at 130. 
 382. Searches were formerly measured by the existence of probable cause in an all-or-nothing 
fashion.  Amsterdam, supra note 208, at 388. 
 383. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 191 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the positive law 
outlawing trespass creates a reasonable expectation of privacy in open fields). 
 384. See id. at 196-97 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the Court’s majority approach 
would not protect privacy interests that all could agree were worth protecting). 
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Finally, in relying on the possibility of observation by air to 
undermine Fourth Amendment privacy expectations—without 
determining the frequency of such over flights, the defendants’ actual 
awareness of such flights, or the extent to which over flights commonly 
gave those flying access to the same information or vantage point as did 
the physical trespassory search on foot that actually took place385—the 
Court reveals the paucity of the privacy theory.  Under any rational 
conception of knowing exposure or assumption of risk principles, 
whether the exposure was in fact knowing (as opposed to reckless, 
negligent, or even unwitting) and whether the risk of exposure was in 
fact assumed would be analytically important considerations,386 and 
these facts that the Court ultimately finds unnecessary to its decision 
would go a long way towards informing those considerations.  This is 
privacy’s fault.  Starting with Katz and going forward, the Court has 
never found it necessary to construe knowledge and risk assumption in 
either their ordinary or specialized legal sense, and it completely ignores 
differences in degree between different types of privacy 
infringements.387 
 
 385. See id. at 179 n.9 (“In practical terms, petitioner Oliver’s and respondent Thornton’s 
analysis merely would require law enforcement officers . . . to use aerial surveillance to gather the 
information necessary to obtain a warrant or to justify warrantless entry onto the property.  It is not 
easy to see how such a requirement would advance legitimate privacy interests.”). 
 386. As one commentator has explained: 
Participation in modern life necessitates exposure of one’s affairs to others.  Under the 
Supreme Court’s current “risk assessment/knowing exposure” doctrine the fourth 
amendment is eliminated from a great many aspects of modern life.  The Court requires 
the individual who seeks full fourth amendment protection to live an isolated life within 
his house with the shades drawn.  This is a choice that most of us are unwilling or unable 
to make.  Long ago an individual could get by without exposing any information to 
others because he lived largely within the four corners of his own land.  But times have 
changed greatly.  We work for others and purchase the goods we need instead of making 
them for ourselves.  We communicate by telephone and live on small tracts of urban 
land.  Modern living compels the exposure of large portions of our lives to others in a 
way that could not be contemplated by the framers of the fourth amendment.  Risk 
assessment analysis leads to a harsh outcome in this modern environment.  It results in 
the denial of fourth amendment coverage to most aspects of modern life simply because 
they take place outside of our homes.  The result is that participation and involvement in 
modern life is incompatible with modern fourth amendment protection.  In the face of 
this approach, the security which the amendment was written to promote disappears. 
Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549, 
567-68 (1990). 
 387. By treating exposure to a limited audience as identical to exposure to the world, the Court 
has failed to recognize degrees of privacy in the Fourth Amendment context: 
A person going on vacation, for example, might give a neighbor the key to her house and 
ask him to water her plants while she is gone.  The neighbor now has explicit permission 
to observe what would otherwise be hidden from view, namely, the inside of the 
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A Fourth Amendment embracing property for personhood would 
produce not only different results, but also would suggest very different 
lines of analysis, and the propertized Fourth Amendment would be 
superior in both respects.  First, personal property models explicitly 
recognize that personhood can be bound up in external things, and thus 
open fields would not automatically be excluded by operation of some 
semantic exercise.  Second, while the extent to which a person’s identity 
is bound up with a thing varies with the person and with the thing,388 
open fields would only be categorically beyond the reach of the Fourth 
Amendment if they were completely fungible, and not personal, 
property.  Some open fields may in fact be fungible, like the land being 
used to grow commercial crops, while other open fields may be more 
proximate to personhood, like the land used to “meet lovers, . . . gather 
together with fellow worshippers, [or] engage in sustained creative 
endeavor.”389  The strength of personal property theories over privacy in 
this regard is that personal property models force explicit consideration 
of those differences between different types of open fields, and provides 
a normative mechanism for making fine distinctions in the level of legal 
protection they deserve.  Even though this more often will necessitate a 
case-by-case determination, which was a concern to the Court in 
Oliver,390 such an ad hoc approach would not produce any of the 
ambiguity or arbitrary variation in enforcement of which the Court 
complained.391 
This is because the propertized Fourth Amendment would be 
obligated to express a moral judgment on the worth of the interests being 
asserted in open fields, and would have to squarely address affirmative 
 
vacationer’s home (at least those parts visible from areas through which he must travel to 
reach the plants).  By granting this permission, the vacationer has forfeited a measure of 
privacy and has thus knowingly exposed part of her home to her neighbor.  Still, if the 
neighbor were to invite his friends or family into the apartment to see the vacationer’s 
personal items, even just those things visible from where the plants are located, that act 
would go beyond the scope of the vacationer’s permission and therefore represent an 
invasion of her privacy.  There are degrees of privacy and, accordingly, degrees of 
exposure, and one might choose to forfeit some of her freedom from exposure without 
thereby forfeiting all of it. 
Colb, supra note 198, at 122-23. 
 388. See Radin, supra note 50, at 959 (suggesting that we can gauge how much a person is 
attached to an object by the emotions felt when it is lost). 
 389. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 192 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 390. See id. at 181-82 (“Nor would a case-by-case approach provide a workable 
accommodation between the needs of law enforcement and the interests protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.”). 
 391. Id. 
73
Halliburton: How Privacy Killed Katz
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009
11-HALLIBURTON_COPYFORPRINTER_FINAL.DOC 4/27/2009  12:44 PM 
876 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:803 
manifestations of the social moral judgment on the value of specific 
open fields by considering the legal and customary standards of the 
community.  A personal property theory of the Fourth Amendment is 
thus superior to privacy if only because it would not allow the Court to 
make pronouncements about societal values while ignoring their 
concrete and positive expression. 
Greater protection of open fields would also be necessary under a 
property-centered Fourth Amendment because, unlike privacy, the 
uninvited frustration of property entitlements do not generally (with the 
exception of adverse possession) diminish those entitlements but rather 
routinely lead to remedial action.392  Even though fences and no 
trespassing signs might not always be effective at keeping the public out, 
their ineffectiveness would never lead to an alteration of the right in the 
property itself.  This is an appealing advantage over the privacy model 
insofar as privacy rights can be destroyed entirely and with respect to all 
parties as soon as they are even partly compromised by one person.  
Using Professor Heffernan’s descriptors, the open fields doctrine is an 
example of the Court’s vigilance approach to defining privacy and for 
making assumptions about private behavior.393  By contrast, the property 
approach to open fields would excel in measuring and justifying social 
conditions relevant to the Fourth Amendment in part because it 
correlates far better with the forbearance model of societal expectations 
than privacy does.394 
As a final comparison to privacy, it appears that using property for 
personhood as a Fourth Amendment framework would produce no 
tension between the knowledge state underlying knowing exposure and 
its other legal uses, nor would it conflate assumption of the risk 
principles with strict liability, and it would therefore facilitate far more 
orderly treatment of these two specialized Fourth Amendment rules. 
 
 392. See generally Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE. L.J. 703 (1996) (disagreeing with the Calabresi-Melamed 
model, arguing that the only difference between liability and property rules is the price of exercising 
the option—the damages to be paid for the nonconsensual taking—and such conceptualization does 
not promote true efficiency); Radin, supra note 50, at 984-85 (stating that the Calabresi-Melamed 
distinction between protecting entitlements with “property rules” or “liability rules” is now a widely 
recognized tool of economic analysis). 
 393. See Heffernan, supra note 221, at 61 (“Under the full vigilance model, everything is 
legitimately subject to surveillance.  Full vigilance makes no allowance for privacy cues, nor does it 
treat anything as a private fact.  Prison life provides a helpful example of full vigilance in action.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 394. See id. at 61 (“Under the forbearance model, a person expects others to exercise restraint, 
once modest efforts have been taken to avoid exposure, concerning matters generally understood to 
be private.  A person similarly expects others to exercise restraint.”). 
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b.  Aerial Surveillance 
The Court’s rules on aerial surveillance by government actors are 
analytically related to, and suffer from many of the same flaws as, the 
open fields doctrine.  The aerial surveillance cases, California v. 
Ciraolo395 and Florida v. Riley,396 together establish the proposition that 
there is no expectation of privacy, even in the curtilage of the home, in 
that which can be viewed from above during legal passage by aircraft.397 
In the more recent of the two cases, Mr. Riley challenged the 
warrantless discovery of contraband growing in his greenhouse as a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.398  Unfortunately for Mr. Riley, 
while he had effectively screened the greenhouse from street-level view, 
he did not preclude members of the public from seeing into the 
greenhouse from an elevated position.399  The Court found that his 
expectation of privacy did not extend to any elevated observations 
because he was found to have knowingly exposed this portion of his 
curtilage to such hypothetical viewers.400  Perhaps even more damning in 
the circumstances of this case, Mr. Riley also left several panels off the 
roof of his greenhouse, which amounted to approximately ten percent of 
the surface area,401 so that he was found to have assumed the risk that 
what was growing inside would be viewed by people traveling in 
airplanes in lawful airspace.402 
The flaws in this approach, again, are much like those in the open 
field area.  The Court declares any expectations of privacy unjustified 
without any basis in, and likely in opposition to, actual opinion; it forces 
the surrender of privacy expectations whenever some partial incursion 
into the allegedly protected space could be hypothesized; it relies on risk 
assumption and knowing exposure without substantiating facts relevant 
 
 395. 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
 396. 488 U.S. 445 (1989). 
 397. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 450-52 (finding that if one leaves activities open for observation 
from an above-passing plane, so long as such a flight is lawful, this act would be construed as 
knowingly exposing those activities and surrendering any expectation of privacy); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 
at 215 (holding that naked-eye aerial observation from an altitude of 1000 feet of a backyard within 
the curtilage of a home does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment). 
 398. Riley, 488 U.S. at 449. 
 399. See id. at 448 (describing Riley’s greenhouse as being blocked from view by trees, shrubs, 
and his mobile home, while noting that some of the greenhouse was exposed to a police officer 
viewing it from the air). 
 400. See id. at 450-51 (holding that since helicopter flights were not uncommon at the altitude 
police viewed the greenhouse, Riley had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the greenhouse). 
 401. Id. at 448. 
 402. See id. at 450-51 (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in areas viewable to the 
public with the naked-eye while flying). 
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to those concepts; and it excuses official non-compliance with important 
social norms. 
It should therefore not be a surprise that a personal property model 
of the Fourth Amendment is more effective in producing outcomes 
consistent with our intuitions and social judgment, and it is capable of 
avoiding the various pitfalls of open fields and aerial surveillance cases.  
In addition, because the personality theory of property under the Fourth 
Amendment provides a consistent theoretical justification and specific 
delineation of rights and interests, the analytical robustness of this 
approach to open fields would also pertain to the aerial surveillance 
arena.  
c.  Dog Sniffs and Thermal Imaging 
In a slight shifting of gears, this final section simultaneously 
addresses two doctrinal aspects of the privacy theory that would not 
likely change drastically if the Fourth Amendment were instead 
informed by notions of property and personhood.  Still, application of 
the propertized Fourth Amendment to dog sniffs403 and thermal 
imagers404 is useful to show how what may appear to be intuitively 
correct outcomes are better explained and justified by the property 
model than they are by privacy norms. 
When presented with a claim that the warrantless inspection of an 
individual’s luggage by a specially trained narcotics detection dog 
violated the Fourth Amendment,405 the Court in United States v. Place406 
declined to decide whether the failure to secure a warrant was justified, 
or even if the officers had probable cause to engage in the intrusive 
behaviors.407  Instead, the Court held that a dog sniff is not a search 
under the Fourth Amendment—without explicitly dealing with privacy 
expectations—based on the nature of the information collected and the 
level of intrusiveness entailed in the examination.408  The information 
 
 403. See generally United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). 
 404. See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 405. Place, 462 U.S. at 698-99. 
 406. Id. at 696 
 407. See id. at 707 (failing to address probable cause because the police’s actions did not 
constitute a search). 
 408. The Court reasoned that 
A “canine sniff” by a well-trained narcotics detection dog . . . does not require opening 
the luggage.  It does not expose non-contraband items that otherwise would remain 
hidden from public view, as does, for example an officer’s rummaging through the 
contents of the luggage.  Thus, the manner in which information is obtained through this 
investigative technique is much less intrusive than a typical search.  Moreover, the sniff 
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collected counseled against declaring the sniff a search because it was 
limited to the presence or absence of contraband and revealed no other 
intimate details about the contents of the luggage.409  The level of 
intrusiveness likewise militated against declaring the sniff a search 
because it was less invasive than opening the individual’s luggage in 
order to search for the information available to the specially trained 
dog.410 
While the outcome in this case may not be of pressing concern, the 
privacy-laden route the Court chose to take is.  Only by reducing a 
privacy interest in luggage to a privacy interest in the odors that emanate 
from the luggage could the Court reject this Fourth Amendment claim 
outright.411  The problem with privacy in this regard is that it focuses on 
reasonable expectations of privacy without offering any consistent 
analytical framework for determining the locus of privacy interests.  
Similarly, it is only because the dog sniff is arguably (although not 
necessarily) less intrusive than opening the luggage, which would 
certainly be a Fourth Amendment search, that it escapes constitutional 
regulation.412  But the way the Court applies its privacy rationale allows 
intrusiveness analysis to obscure meaningful parallels between the actual 
dog sniff and the more intrusive means that would trigger Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny, and it allows the Court to treat the examination as 
a non-search just because the circumstances of the invasion could have 
been more severe.413 
The Court’s lone thermal imaging decision, Kyllo v. United 
States,414 while invalidating the police practice as an impermissible 
warrantless search, proceeds upon the same two unhelpful privacy-based 
premises as Place.415  First, the Court declared that thermal imaging 
applied to the home constitutes a search because of the intimate nature of 
 
discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item. 
Id. 
 409. See id. at 707 (“This limited disclosure also ensures that the owner of the property is not 
subjected to the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive 
investigative methods.”). 
 410. Id. at 707. 
 411. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (noting that the privacy interest in 
the bag was not violated by a drug sniffing dog). 
 412. See id. (focusing on the fact that police did not have to open the bag to detect the presence 
of narcotics). 
 413. Id. 
 414. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 415. See id. at 32-40 (using a Katz-based privacy analysis to determine whether the police 
actions constituted a search). 
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the information collected.416  Given that the imager gave officers access 
to information about the inside of the home, which they would not 
otherwise have had, and in light of the presumptive protection a home 
receives under the privacy approach to the Fourth Amendment, the 
information was deemed so sensitive and potentially intimate that the 
Fourth Amendment must come into play.417  Second, the Court reasoned 
that the method of surveillance was so intrusive that it necessarily 
crossed the privacy line and would be considered a search.418  The 
thermal imaging devices used in Kyllo affect such a deep intrusion in 
part because they were directed at a home.419  But the Court also found 
that this type of intrusion is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment 
privacy principle because it was achieved by reliance on technology not 
generally used by or available to the public and thus violated reasonable 
societal expectations.420 
The use of privacy to deal with thermal imagers, while producing 
appealing results in the only decided case, is subject to the same 
analytical impeachment as it is when used to evaluate dog sniffs.  The 
nature of the information inquiry is not conceptually rigorous enough to 
determine with precision the nature or locus of the privacy interest being 
protected.  Just as in Place, where the Court attributed the privacy claim 
not to the luggage but to the odors,421 the Kyllo Court could have 
ascribed the privacy interest not to the home, but to the waste heat it 
radiated.422  The dissenting Justices in Kyllo argued this,423 and 
obviously this analytical move would have caused the Court to rule the 
other way.  The Fourth Amendment should not be so susceptible of such 
 
 416. See id. at 34 (“We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information 
regarding the interior of the home that could not be otherwise obtained without physical ‘intrusion 
into a constitutionally protected area,’ . . . constitutes a search . . . .”). 
 417. See id. at 37 (“In the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details, because the 
entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.”). 
 418. See id. at 38 (“Limiting the prohibition of thermal imaging to ‘intimate details’ would not 
only be wrong in principle; it would be impractical in application, failing to provide ‘a workable 
accommodation between the needs of law enforcement and the interests protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.’”) (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984)). 
 419. See id. at 37 (citation omitted) (distinguishing between aerial photography of an industrial 
complex and aerial photography of a home, with the latter constituting “detecti[on of] private 
activities occurring in private areas”). 
 420. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (noting that the thermal image scanner 
used by police was not in use by the general public). 
 421. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (reasoning that the privacy interest in 
the luggage itself was not violated when the narcotics dog sniffed the bag). 
 422. Cf. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37-38 (refuting the government’s argument that heat radiating 
outside the home does not disclose significant information about the home). 
 423. Id. at 41. 
78
Akron Law Review, Vol. 42 [2009], Iss. 3, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol42/iss3/6
11-HALLIBURTON_COPYFORPRINTER_FINAL.DOC 4/27/2009  12:44 PM 
2009] HOW PRIVACY KILLED KATZ 881 
manipulation and uncertainty in enforcement, but privacy actually 
invites its own abuse. 
The level of intrusiveness prong is similarly no more defensible 
here than in Place.  While thermal imagers are, at least until the Court 
takes the next imaging case, perceived to be so uncommon as to be 
beyond the scope of reasonable privacy expectations, their public 
ubiquity in the future would be enough to undermine the Court’s rule to 
that effect.424  But just as in Place,425 that change or difference in the 
perceived depth of the intrusion would not automatically explain why 
the threat to privacy has diminished, nor why a fundamental right should 
be so conditioned on coincidental practical factors rather than explicit 
normative values. 
The value of the personal property alternative to Fourth 
Amendment privacy in the context of dog sniffs and thermal imagers is 
that it better explains the outcomes we might intuitively prefer, and 
would lead to those outcomes by a less circuitous and analytically more 
coherent route.  At the outset, one advantage of the property approach is 
that the personal informational property component of property for 
personhood under the Fourth Amendment is specifically designed to 
deal with intangible seizures of information such as these.  It would 
therefore be easy to explicate the connections between the Fourth 
Amendment and the surveillance methods challenged, and a reviewing 
court would not have to stretch analogies between physical and non-
physical invasions in a way that unduly narrows the rights respected in 
the latter scenario. 
The personal informational property model of the Fourth 
Amendment does not rely on imprecise categories of information in 
order to decide which types of information represent protected interests, 
and general distinctions between degrees of intrusiveness are not 
conceptually relevant.  Instead, the personal informational property 
model of the Fourth Amendment will rely on specific and verifiable 
considerations of the proximity of the information to matters of 
personhood, and will sidestep the intrusiveness inquiry in favor of 
assessing the impact on or harm to the individual’s sense of self and her 
 
 424. See id. at 34 (basing the rationale for finding a search unconstitutional partly on the use of 
thermal imaging equipment unavailable to the public at large). 
 425. Compare United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (finding no privacy interest in 
contents of bag violated when drug sniffing dog sniffed criminal defendant’s bag), with Kyllo, 533 
U.S. at 40 (finding privacy interest violated when police used a thermal imaging camera to detect 
heat emanating from defendant’s home). 
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ability to project a continuing pattern of personal identity into the 
external world.426 
If called on to decide the question presented in Place, using the 
personal informational property perspective, a court would have to ask 
whether luggage or information pertaining to luggage is the kind of thing 
or the kind of information with which a person’s identity can be 
intimately associated, or whether luggage is itself important to 
constituting the self.  It is rather clear that, unless the luggage contains 
separate and specific personal property, the luggage itself and its 
contents are ordinarily considered fungible property and thus less 
deserving of legal protection.  Even with designer luggage, fancy outfits, 
and salon cosmetics, suitcases and the clothes and toiletries they 
typically contain are not in general considered matters essential to 
realizing personhood.  While this is not invariably true, personal 
informational property both supports this as the default position and 
provides a basis for identifying the rare and exceptional case, whereas 
with privacy the categorization of the information leads to an all-or-
nothing distributive allocation of interests. 
Likewise, personal informational property’s focus on harm to the 
individual as a consequence of interference with property, instead of 
abstract comparisons of relative intrusiveness, supports the outcome in 
Place because the interference with or loss of luggage rarely damages an 
individual’s core identity or prevents his or her attainment of personhood 
status.  I contend that no rational member of society would describe one 
whose luggage was lost by an air carrier as being less than a full person 
because of that loss, and we can glean from this an understanding that 
depriving a person of this kind of property does not invade the property 
of personhood.  While avoiding all the complexity of the privacy model, 
personal informational property can resolve the dog sniff question in an 
explicit and theoretically coherent fashion. 
If called upon to decide the question presented in Kyllo using the 
personal informational property perspective, a court would engage in 
these same two steps.  It would assess the strength of the connection 
between the “thing,” or information emanating from the “thing,” and 
individual identity or self realization, and it would gauge the harm to the 
person that would result if the interest in property is invaded. 
Personal informational property replicates the privacy-based Fourth 
Amendment’s outcome in Kyllo because the house is one of the central 
 
 426. See supra Part III.C.1-2 (describing personal informational property and its application to 
address weaknesses in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). 
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objects that can define who we are as persons, and it is often the location 
of information and behaviors affecting our personal development and 
unfolding life history.427  In the same vein, it is very easy to appreciate 
the severe impact on personhood entailed in taking away an individual’s 
home, however modest or grand it may be, or in acquiring information 
produced therein.  Thus, the personal informational property or the 
personhood model of the Fourth Amendment provides the same scope of 
protection as does privacy because the house and related information are 
central to personhood, but the protection is not conditioned upon such an 
impermanent factor as the public availability of sense-enhancing 
technologies and the analysis necessary to reach this conclusion is far 
less convoluted. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Article represents a concerted effort to substantiate a cascade 
of related claims.  The Article proposes to show that a deep and 
immediate threat to cognitive liberty is posed by the non-consensual use 
of CCTs, and that a privacy-driven Fourth Amendment cannot maintain 
the cerebral zone of exclusion that our humanity, or our personhood, 
requires.  An effort was then made to show that privacy was neither the 
first, nor the best, answer to the Fourth Amendment’s considerable 
interpretive challenge and to suggest that a property-centered model of 
the Fourth Amendment, one which builds upon Professor Radin’s theory 
of property for personhood and respects personal informational property, 
provides more consistent and more just protection in a wide range of 
surveyed circumstances.  The point is that property norms produce better 
results, supply superior moral decision-making frameworks, and have 
stronger claims to constitutional heritage than the privacy model 
announced in Katz. 
And it is upon striking that last blow, I hope, that Katz breathes its 
last breath.  I launched this assault on the Katz doctrine because, in spite 
of some important and valuable revolutionary steps, privacy killed Katz 
and all else it offered the legal system because privacy proved capable of 
functionally undoing all of Katz’s progressive reform.  It is because of 
privacy the fetish into which Katz has been transformed that there is an 
increasingly real possibility that the government can and will invade the 
solitude of the human mind and thereby destroy the sense of personhood 
that flows from identification with this inner cognitive landscape.  
 
 427. Radin, supra note 50, at 978. 
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Respect for the value of that mental solitude and cognitive freedom led 
me to pursue the new personal property theory of the Fourth 
Amendment offered here as a way to defeat or disarm CCTs, but what I 
found along the way was a method for revitalizing the Fourth 
Amendment as an individual liberty provision, and a way to return the 
Fourth Amendment to its preferred position within the constitutional 
framework by restoring the links between the Fourth Amendment’s 
freedom guarantees and our fundamental liberty interest in being persons 
who associate with and express ourselves through property.  It is my 
great hope that this theoretical endeavor helps us become and remain 
complete, fully realized, and fundamentally free persons living in a 
society organized around a normatively and intellectually honest system 
of law. 
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